
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT


Crown Copyright documents reproduced by courtesy of The National Archives, London, England. www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

The National Archives give no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or fitness for the purpose of the information provided.

Images may be used only for purposes of research, private study or education. Applications for any other use should be made to The National Archives Image Library, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU.



645 E 9736 E 20 OCT 1947 PALESTINE attendance of Brojelian ambarrowton al the annual Remembrand Day Parede of the aspectation of suit & Koroviemen Registry Number E 9436 [H[]31 FROM 4.1. Minute the ambandor has been invited to attend the No. Parode the spirite prepared to do so but would like the scarly mean of the taregan office. P. H.KINIG Dated Received in Registry 13.001 20 -Last Paper (Minutes.) 9722 SA Dept Jud. 24/6 Jonr. 4 References 371 RECORD OFFICE, (Print) 61792 LONDO (How disposed of)



Minutes. Envir E 9736 3 bastin Dept The Brazilian limbroundor has been initial to attend the Connucl Remembrance Day Parade gibe assn., J Jessish Joz- Servicemen. He is quite prepared to do so, but med like the early view of the Foreign affice, bearing in mind he is The Doyen of the Driplomatic Corps. World you please let me have you show ? 13 10. White the Thave consulted the CO. mey say that the Association is in no sense a 2ionist or political Lewish body as such (thingh individual members may be)

ల 7

61792

Margin

5 Nothing

linere secons us reason for us to dissuade the Ambassado form

Ą Minutes. from attending on politicil grounds. N 0 He win no doubt judge The Case on its ments and in The light of mi engagements. Treaty bept may have obs. in this Margin 211. Beins 8 dr. 15 Greatz Dept. can see Nothing to be Written no objection. Have since spoken ti Brazilian Brubusay + it appears 61792 refut the Contrassador inledection. pnx 16/10.


COPYRIGHT

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

LON DO

Reference

3 2 7



Egybb /G Z alistin EABTERN 11b E 9766 /46/C U.S. policy in Palestine New York 2956 Dates 17 000 Received 2000. Last Paper. (Minutes.) E9122 It is sw prising if he poling is References. that of Mr Marshall, that it is hot more realistic. Nothing definite energes from Mr Johnson's four (Print.) 371 points : indeed I do not understand the last sartence of (How disposed of.) 6179 being refled (D) at all. て At the moment we have the initiative and our two been Statements have trantactor clear. We shalld be able to mantain treinpronktion When our plans for with drawal are (Index.) (Action completed.) cut and dried. $|\omega|$ Next Paper. Planun (DEITH) V 21/x BABSurow 21/x BABSurow 30047 F.O.P.





[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE E9766

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Mations)

No. 2956D. 4.45 p.m.17th October, 194717th October, 1947R. 12.40 a.m.18th October, 1947

IMMEDIATE SECRET AND PERSONAL

Cypher/OTP

Following from Secretary of State for Colonies.

Points made to me by Herschel Johnson in recent conversations on Palestine were:-

(A) United States policy was largely that of Marshall.

(B) Any scheme must be not a United States scheme but a United Nations scheme.

(C) He was anxious that neither vacuum nor chaos should occur when Britain withdrew but orderly transfer to United Nations authority, though he appreciated importance of parties being forced up against need for accommodation if dire consequences were to be avoided.

(D) He may not be altogether in agreement with us as to our position under the mandate, but appreciated and understood our situation and our desire for early withdrawal. He realised that United Nations may not be as quick to find substitute as we would like, but stressed that every effort should be made. He wanted the situation prepared as quickly as practicable when control passes into other hands.


2. In conversation with Silver on October 17th I learnt that he was concerned that the difficulties of implementation and withdrawal should not be disproportionately represented. I told him that assumption underlying American statement was not one we would work on, that some accommodation between the parties was essential, and that while a well-planned substitute central authority in Palestine was essential too much reliance should not be placed on its creation and implementation. He urged friendliness with Britain.

Please pass copy to Colonial Office.

[Ends]

[Copies sent to the Colonial Office]

888



647 9779 E 20 OCT PALESTINE 1947 Unnest of Fire anned Teast lup Mymand }E9779/ 46/31 Registry Number hope in the TELEGRAM FROM auning to Leeup What Cary 11' Durdas Alythicotion ere aper wer amestin No 1 apres No.Damareus Look Kitcis inide and and a alar 1al rol Dated Rollich ler Banial Mar 1458 Received in Registry 9 dealify annuing to 10 loop C 1 Plan 20,001 Samo 20 HODREFFED TERUSALEM 82 ·----(Minutes.) Last Paper. Ely the in App. Mathicson) 9766 COPYRIGHT Refe References. 20/10 ÛF PUBLIC 37 RECORD (Print.) OFFICE, 6179 (How disposed of.) Malhenan. 6 LOND で (on E9705/951/31 5) Palestine Regy. C. O (Church House) (under E9858/46/31 0ct · 23 (Index.) (Action completed.) Next Paper. E9782 Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM


Mr. Dundas. No. 82. 20th October, 1947. Repeated to: Foreign Office No. 458. <u>IMMEDIATE</u> D: 12.52 p.m.20th October, 1947. R: 2.15 p.m.20th October, 1947.

Syrian Minister of Derence last might told me that five armed Jews claiming to be auxiliary police but possessing no identification papers were arrested yesterday evening by a Syrian patrol one and a half kilometres inside the Syrian frontier near Banias. I have been in touch with A.D.C. S.A.F.A.D. and a British inspector of police is coming to Damascus to-day to identify the five.

2. Minister of Defence has kept me fully informed and appears to be most reasonable but has requested that any members of Palestine security forces who may have legitimate occasion to cross the Syrian frontier should be provided with unmistakable identity papers.

@@





CYPHER/OTP

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM


Mr. Dundes. No. 82.		D:	12.52	p.m.20th	October,	1947
20th October,	1947.	R:	2.15	p.m.2 0th	October,	1947
Repeated to:	Foreign	0 f fi	ice No.	458.		

DAMEDIATE

Syrian Minister of Defence last night told me that five armed Jews claiming to be auxiliary police but possessing no identification papers were arrested yesterday evening by a Syrian patrol one and a half kilometres inside the Syrian frontier near Baniss. I have been in touch with A.D.C. S.A.F.A.D. and a British inspector of police is coming to Damascus to-day to identify the five.

Minister of Defence has kept me fully informed and 2. appears to be most reasonable but has requested that any members of Palestine security forces who may have legitimate occasion to cross the Syrian frontier should be provided with unmistakable identity papers.

୍ତ୍ତ୍ର



PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group $... F_{O}$ Class ... 37/Piece ... 6/7.92

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:

371

61792

5)

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

E9782/46/31

bug [O]E_9831 22 OCT 1947 PALESTINE Future of Palatine. Rifan prenicus contempendiner (E2206/4/31/46) Registry Number (29831/46/31 FROM transmit memoriendem en futine properities paletine ne mining for polarti fentitiers dete 0. Hamer 89 Instow No. Gans Dated Kinsington Received in Registry 18,001 んみ Last Paper (Minutes.) boly to c.o. 9782 Instite That me have admontholged References his previous letters, no me had better ælmowledge this me as well. 37 Imbound dall RECORD (Print) OFFICE, E.R. Defertung. 61792 LON DOI (How disposed of) M.E.Sysin_ CT.E.CABLE) Transfe ack Is better, I thought 28/10 3 60. 56




Telephone Number: Kensington 6520

IMPORTANT *and URGENT.

- 18th October, 1947

To:-The Rt.Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Office, Downing Street, London S.W.1



Sir,

The Palestine resources - a proposition for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

In view of the apparent intention of His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine, I would urge you, in the interests of the peoples of Palestine, of our own Empire and of the world-atlarge, to consider favourably and to take advarntage of the position which now exists as regards the Palestine Government and myself concerning their long-standing offer to me of rights under the Mining Laws to explore for and develop the mineral resources in certain defined areas in Palestine. These areas cover some 4,000 sq.kilometres of land to the South West and South of the Dead Sea.

I am legally entitled to corresponding rights over a similar area in Transjordan, but I am not including this subject in my present communication.

If these exploration and development rights in Palestine, which are still available to me, are secured by Great Britain, they will, under International Law, provide Great Britain with the master-key to the opening up of what is probably the greatest storehouse of potash fertiliser minerals and of magnesium and other minerals vitally essential agriculture and industry. This storehouse, which is of colossal potential value, is also shared by Transjordan, as part of it lies at depth in both countries.

2. This offer, which was first made to me by the Palestine Government in January 1933, was in respect of all minerals, <u>including</u> oil. But, following the representations of certain <u>international</u> oil interests, the British Government, in 1934, intervened to cause the exploratory operations in Palestine and Transjordan to be held up indefinitely. In 1936, the offer was narrowed down to exclude therefrom the right to search for oil to which I had become legally entitled in 1934.

		
E	4	
F		
F.	2	
_		
-	3	
E	#	
E		
\vdash	G	
-		
E	0	
		0
	Reference: NO	COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONG
11.6		RECORD
\square		OFF
ဘ		CE,
		-

て

After due consideration, I agreed to accept the 1936 offer without prejudice to the oil-position which I had already established. But, the Arab Strike had already begun in April 1936, and in consequence of the disturbed state of the Country resulting from that Strike and from the subsequent Arab Revolution, exploration was again held up as field-work could not be undertaken with safety. In 1938, special oil-mining legislation was enacted by which, no matter what happened, certain International Groups would control the exploitation of the Palestine oilfield.

The Palestine Government then re-affirmed its offer to me, but the Country remained unsafe for field-work up to the outbreak of the Second World War. During that War, His Majesty's Government informed me that it had vetoed exploratory work in Palestine and Transjordan for the War period.

In the autumn of 1945, i.e. after the end of the/War, /the offer

World

To:- The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.,

Page 2 18th October, 1947

12

the offer was again renewed by the Palestine Government, but, the widespread campaign of post-war Jewish Terrorist activities which was then launched, caused the proposed exploration, once again, to be postponed.

3. Great Britain is desperately in need of an increase in her food production. Furthermore, owing to the economic chaos followeing the ravages of war, the whole world must re-establish its agriculture on a sound basis.

For this purpose, increasingly large amounts of Potash for fertilisers will be widely needed. But these are not forthcoming even to the extent available in pre-war days.

Long before the 1914 War, Germany had established a Monopoly of the production of Potash Salts. Although this Monopoly, broken by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany, through Cartel Agreements, soon met re-established her control of the world's production of and markets for potash salts. In 1939, the world's supplies of potash fertilisers came mainly from Ru European sources, the output, prices and quotas in the markets being regulated by a German-controlled European Potash Cartel: the bulk of the potash sold in the world's markets came from the German Potash Mines.


During the Second World War supplies of potash fertilisers were scanty, and since the end of that War, the amounts available from the European sources do not reach pre-war level. For, the Alsatian and Polish Potash Mines were deliberately sabotaged during the withdrawal of the German Armies of occupation, and although the German Potash Mines fell into the Allies' hands in good working order, only a small part of their output is now available to Great Britain and the outside world, as at least 60 per cent of the German Potash Mining area is in the hands of Russia.

Fresh sources of supply of potash salts and fertilisers have become an urgent necessity. The time is therefore ripe for the foundation of a Potash Mining Industryin Palestine based, as in Germany, upon the mining of the subterrahean deposits of potash and magnesium minerals(carnallite) which are widely dispersed throughout the land. In point of fact, these deposits in Palestine(and Transjordan) could enable a potash industry to be built up in these lands with a producing power greater than that of the German Potash Syndicate.

The subterranean deposits of mineralised chemicals, etc., 4. which occur in Palestine and Transjordan, are far greater in extent than those which occur in the Potash Mining areas of Germany and of other countries. Moreover, as in the German potash areas, oil deposits are also to be found at depths below the potash-bearing strata.

German and other scientists have long known of the existence of these deposits which have been deliberately kept fallow in the commercial interests of the I.G.Farbenindustrie, of the German Potash Syndicate and of certain international oil combines(vide Section VII of the enclosed memorandum)

My first approach to the British Government on these matters was made in 1917-1918 when there was a war-shortage of oil and of potash fertilisers. After the Government's own /appointed



Reference

とい

5

1

THE

PUBLIC

RECORD

OFFICE,

To:-The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.,

18th October, 1947

13

Reference

37

9

1

0

64

C

RECORD

appointed experts had reported favourably upon my findings, steps were taken to set my proposals in motion in the autumn of 1918. But, influences were already at work to decry the potential value of these resources, and to deny **methods** their existence, and to delay or block the systematic exploration and test-drilling of the land.

Apparently, so long as the British Government was in control of Palestine, the disclosure and exploitation of the eff vast resources at depth below its soil did not suit the policies of the above-mentioned international interests.

In consequence, official attention was directed merely to the extraction of salts from the waters of the Dead Sea, and the subterranean deposits of oil and minerals were ignored. After a delay of twelve years, a Company was given rights to exploit the waters of the Dead Sea- with certain reservations. But, owing to the terms of the concession, this Company could not become a competitor of the German Potash Syndicate in the World's markets, nor could it affect the Oil position.

As a matter of fact, in 1936, this Dead Sea Company (Palestine Potash Ltd.) became associated with the German-controlled European Potash Cartel, and its output by the time of the outbreak of War in September 1939, was still only a fraction of that But, even if this Company were now needed by Great Britain. free from the Cartel Agreements by which the German Potash Syndicate controlled its prices, output and quotas on the markets, for technical reasons, and by virtue of the limitations limited scope of its activities, it could never produce potash on a scale adequate to meet the needs of Great Britain, let alone those of the British Empire and of the awakening Far and This end can only be achieved by a Potash Mining Middle East. Industry established in accordance with the provisions of the Palestine Mining Laws.

In this connexion, it is interesting to note that the offer which was made to me in 1933 regarding rights to

explore for and develop the oil and mineral resources of Palestine under the Mining Laws over a large area, was consequent upon the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Concessions by the then Shah of Persia in December 1932^{*-} an event which caused grave anxiety about our oil-position in the Near and Middle East.

But when the position in Persia was re-adjusted in the early months of 1933, official delays again served to block the search for oil in Palestine. In fact, it is perhaps significant that test-drilling for oil in a region which was favourably reported upon in 1934 by experts of the company concerned, has been started in earnest now that Great Britain has decided to surrender the Mandate and withdraw from Palestine !

5. I would say that, throughout all these years, I have held fast to my position as I have always hoped that His Majesty's Government would, eventually, form a Chartered Company for the development of these truly colossal resources of Palestine(and Transjordan) in order to promote the welfare of the peoples of these countries, and to enable the world-at-large to have access to and to share these vitally essential commodities. Such action would be an asset of the greatest value to the British Commonwealth of Nations which needs unrestricted access to sources

/ of potash fertilisers

* (or at the end of November 1932.)

18th October, 1947 Page 4.

C

RECORD

37

(mail)

1

9

て

etc.

To:- The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.

of potash fertiliser minerals and of magnesium and other minerals in order to maintain its independence of alien-controlled cartels.

The position regarding the deposits of mineral resources in Palestine, to which I would now draw your attention, is similar to that which preceded the British development of the Persian oilfields.

You may recall that it was due to the foresight of the late Mr. Pretyman, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, that the British Government availed itself of the opportunity afforded by the rights granted to Mr.D'Arcy, by the then Shah of Persia to secure the Persian oilfields for the use of Great Britain, and to enable the British Government to acquire a controlling-interest in their development. It is known that, but for the initiative of Mr.Pretyman, this oilfield would have gone into the hands of an alien power.


The utilisation of the rights offered to me by the Palestine Government would enable the British Government to secure a substantial share in the real development of the resources of Palestine, and would safeguard her agriculture from an alien control of essential supplies of potash fertilisers.

In the past, Germany controlled these commodities: to-day, it is no secret that American finance is making large-scale plans to gain possession of and to exploit the veritable treasurehouse which exists in Palestine and Transjordan.

If, therefore, Great Britain loses the opportunity which my position affords, and the U.S.A. should gain monopolistic control of these illimitable resources, the American Chemical Industry, built up since 1914, would be able to dominate the world's chemical and fertiliser industries and markets as did the I.G.Farbenindustrie and the German Potash Syndicate before 1939.

Such a situation would seriously affect the position of the British Chemical Industry in the world's markets.

For your personal information, I would say that, some 6. fifteen years ago, when I had occasion to discuss the matter of the Palestine deposits with Lord Me. Gowan of the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., he expressed the opinion that it should



Enclosure:-

be taken up by the British Government. Possibly this attitude was due to the fact that, in those days, the I.C?I. washot a free agent, owing to its association with the I.G.Farben'industrie, and the German Potash Syndicate, etc., in cartel agreements.

If the stranglehold of German interests upon American and British, and other chemical industries was really broken by the defeat of Germany, it is possible that Lord McGowan might welcome the opportunity of aiding the British Government in the proposals which I have put before you, and which present opportunities for aiding the world infinitely beyond the powers of the present Palestine Potash Company Ltd.

Should you wish for further details, I shall be happy to call upon you at any time that may be convenient to you.

> Thave the honour to be, Your obedient servant, (A.Homer) M.A., Sc.D., F.R. I.C. A copy of my Memorandum on the Future of Palestine for your easy reference. A copy was sent to you on the 6th of March, 1946.

COPY of a Memorandum compiled in January 1946 for the consideration of the Anglo-American Committee on the Jewish Problem in Europe and the Future of Palestine. 15

37

-

j.....

20

2

RECORD

A

MEMORANDUM

on

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIES

AS THE MEANS TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF

PALESTINE

BY A. Homer, M.A., Sc.D., F.R.I.C., etc.

I. THE RECONOMIC POSITION OF FALESTINE IN THE FAST.

Prior to, and during the early part of the Christian Era, the lands of Palestine and Transjordan were fertile, and supported thraving communities. Palestine was described as "a land flowing with milk and honey"; while Transjordan, under an efficient system of water storage and aqueducts, was a veritable granary from which food was exported. However, during subsequent centuries, the despoiling hands of conquerors and of marauders reduced many of the once-flourishing cities to ruins, denuded the lands of trees and vegetation, and destroyed the water system beyond the possibility of repair by the impoverished inhabitants. The hillsides became barren, and large portions of the countryside were changed to sandy desert wastes. In consequence, except in the fertile maritime plain and certain other areas, the husbandman could only wrest a bare subsistence from the soil.

At the beginning of the present century, the agriculture

of these countries, which were under Tarkish rule, was considered "backward". The improvement of the industry by the education of the farmers, by the suientific treatment of the soil, by the use of modern agricultural equipment, by building adequate water-storage tanks, by boring for water, by afforestation, etc., needed considerable capital. Some forty-five years ago, few financiers would have been prepared to advance to Arab landowners or farmers the capital needed for the large-scale regeneration of the soil in these countries, when there are potentially more profitable areas in the Middle East, where there are ample supplies of river-water for irrigation.

However, a new factor had already appeared in the Palestine picture. From 1880 onwards, Jewish refugees from Russia and Eastern Europe obtained permission to settle in Palestine. They established agricultural colonies, and tried to apply modern methods to the development and regeneration of Palestine soil. Their numbers, however, were still comparatively few on the outbreak of the First World War.

During 1917-1918, the suzerainty of Turkey over Palestine and Transjordan was broken. Palestine, hitherto regarded by the industrially-minded Western Nations as of no economic value, now assumed a position of potential importance in world affairs. For freed from Turkish rule, it could provide

/ at Haifa

at Haifa, a harbour of importance to naval strategy, which could also serve as a point of debouchment for the Oil which was to be brought from the Mosul Oilfields by pipe-line to the West; it was on the air routes for the products of the awakening hinterlands of the Middle East in which huge oilfields were being disclosed. Palestine had, in fact, become a land with an economic future, worth the risk of capital expenditure on its regeneration and westernisation.

×

a BLUE

in

BOOK

1938

and

16

37

S

17

9

RECORD


OFFI

LOND

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 served as an impetus for the migration to Palestine of large numbers of Jews, mainly from Eastern Europe and from Russia. The movement was well supplied with funds, provided not only by ardent Zionists, but also by non-Zionists, some of whom openly regarded the Zionist Movement as a means to an end. Agricultural molonies were established with the means at their disposal to apply modern methods of scientific farming, and of agricultural engineering, to the problems of restoring productivity to the soil, and providing food and employment for the Jewish settlers. Towns and villages were also built, and a stream of immigrants, of which large numbers were city dwellers, flowed into Palestine before the country was in a position to absorb them. By 1939. their numbers had reached some 500,000, in spite of the fact that Commissions of Enquiry had recommended that the influx of immigrants should be regulated by the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

In consequence of the increasing state of tension as between Arabs, Jews and the Administration, His Majesty's Government issued a White Faper in 1939 embodying proposals for the partitioning of Palestine, and placing certain restrictions upon Jewish immigration.

As an aftermath of the Second World War, large numbers of Jews wish to migrate from the War-shattered zones of Hurope. Notwithstanding the hostility of the Arab peoples, there are to-day, persistent demands for the immediate absorption of great numbers of Jews into Falestine. To accommodate them, proposals are afoot for reclaiming large tracts of land in Falestine, which are now desolate, and, in the near future, to settle thereon some 4,000,000 Jews, the ultimate aim being to increase the numbers to 15,000,000 or even 20,000,000, which some authorities consider to be the absorptive capacity of Greater Palestine.



Moreover, it is claimed in certain quarters that, as a result of planned improvements, Palestinian agriculture will eventually provide food for the millions of immigrants in view, and will play an important part in converting Palestine into a prosperous and thriving community.

II. THE FATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF PALESTINE.

For economic reasons, however, the path to the future prosperity of Palestine lies in the foundation of industries based upon the vast natural resources of the country, which, if effectively developed, would make of Palestine one of the world's most important industrial centres. It does not lie in costly schemes for the reclamation and regeneration of agricultural land which has suffered from centuries of neglect. For, the capital cost of such regeneration would adversely affect the /economic export

* Omitted by mistake from the text of the original manuscript.

economic export of agricultural products, and hamper trade barter.

Experience has shown that an industrialised country can attain a higher degree of prosperity and culture than it is possible for an agricultural community to achieve. In fact, a country whose soil is incapable of producing economically even one-half of the food it requires, can become exceedingly prosperous if its terrain is yich in natural resources essential to modern civilisation, and if those resources are effectively exploited and used as source materials for industries.

This generalisation is particularly applicable to Palestine and Transjordan, which contain vast resources of raw materials, from which can be produced KEY SUBSTANCES of vital importance to industry and commerce in times of peace and war.

ITI. THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF PALESTINE.

For centuries past, Palestine and Transjordan have been considered of no economic importance, all interest in them being confined to their religious, historical and archaeological significance.

But, all unsuspected, these lands, from time immemorial, have guarded one of the world's most extensive storehouses of Oil and Mineral wealth, of which, as scientists now recognise, the phenomena of the Dead Sea Region, of the Dead Sea itself, and of the Ghor, are but surface indications.

For some thousands of years, mankind has observed many of these phenomena without sensing their import as to what lay hidden at depth below the surface of these lands. Indeed, familiar though countless millions are with the story, few people, even in these scientific times, realise that the cataclysm responsible for the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and the fate of Lot's Wife, provide visible clues as to the existence of subterranean deposits of colossal value.

The natural resources of these countries are greater

in extent than those upon which Germany was able to build up huge chemical industries which enabled her to gain monopolistic powers in the world's markets in preparation for her bid for World Domination.

It is just over a hundred years ago since scientific interest was aroused in these regions. Thereafter, exploratory expeditions were sent out under the auspices of the governments of America, Britain, Egypt, France and Turkey; of various organisations; of Oil and Chemical interests; and of private persons. A wealth of valuable information was gleaned and put on record in official reports, in scientific journals, and in private documents available to a privileged few.

The following minerals are to be found in various localities in Palestine and Transjordan:-


Limestone, Dolomite, and phosphate-bearing rocks of very high grade: Alaunite, Gypsum, Rock-Salt, Carnallite: Sulphur, Selenium, Tellurium: Titaniferous, Manganiferous and Chromium Oxide Iron Ores: Ores containing Copper, Silver, Lead, Antimony, Nickel: Tungsten and Thorium compounds:

/Alluvial deposits

37

179

RECORD



13

37

5

Ž Ž

9

RECORD

Radio-active elements, to which is due the radioactivity of the waters of the Dead Sea and of the thermal springs which are a feature of these countries.

It is also on record that other localities near the Dead Sea arerich in minerals, and should be fully investigated.

IV. COLOSSAL POTENTIAL WEALTH OF THE PALESTINE RESOURCES.


The colossal potential wealth of the natural resources of Falestine and Transjordan can be gauged from the composition of two surface features, namely, Djebel Usdom (the "Mountain of Salt") and the Dead Sea.

According to a former Geological Adviser to the Palestine Government, the late Mr G.S.Blake, there are some 1,000,000,000 tons of Rock Salt exposed in Djebel Usdom. This mineralised deposit is considered to have been thrust upwards from lower strata during the cataclysm which changed the configuration of the Southern End of the Dead Sea.

The Dead Sea itself is now some fifty miles long and ten miles wide, but, in geological time, it was 250 miles long and 50 miles wide. Its salinity has been famed from antiquity. According to an official report published by the Crown Agents for the Colonies in 1925, there are in solution in the Dead Sea some 22,000,000,000 tons of magnesium chloride, 11,900,000,000 tons of common salt, 2,000,000,000 tons of potassium chloride, and 980,000,000 tons of Bromine as Bromide.

The potential wealth of the salts in solution in the Dead Sea, at pre-war market values, was thus of the order of \$200,000,000,000.

The Dead Sea also contains <u>GOLD</u> in solution, its pre-war value according to the calculations of Professor Claude,




a famous French Scientist, being some £10,000,000,000, of which he considered some £3,000,000,000 could be profitably extracted therefrom within a period of fifteen years. My own more conservative estimate of the value of the Gold was of £5,000,000,000.

The above figures, astounding though they may be, represent but a fraction of the subterranean treasures which exist in Palestine and Transjordan, and of which these and other phenomena are but surface indications of their widespread In actuality, deposits of mineralised salts distribution. have been detected not only in the El Lisan-Djebel Usdom region of the Dead Sea area, but also in several places along the Jordan-Arabah-Akabah alignment, in the uplands, and even in the maritime plain. Moreover, the widespread distribution of subterranean salt-bearing strata is no secret to those who, officially or privately, have drilled for water in various parts of Palestine. In many localities, the search for underground sources of water for irrigation, or for drinking purposes, has been fruitless because of its salinity, or of the presence of Oil or Salt-bearing strara at depth.

As a matter offact, Palestine and Transjordan have a

/still



- 5 -

still further source of wealth in the extensive Oilfields which have long been known to exist therein. Geologists and Oil Technologists consider these Oilfields to be of great promise in certain localities, and it only remains for their effective drilling to provide these countries with an added source of wealth.

V. <u>THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF</u> <u>FALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN TO THE FOUNDATION OF</u> <u>INDUSTRIES IN PALESTINE</u>.

On the face of it, there is ample source material for the foundation of industries of inestimable value to these countries, not only by virtue of income to be derived from royalties and share of profits, but also by the stimulation of trade through the employment of labour of all grades. Thus: -

> The initiation of great industries in Palestine, based upon the resources of the countries, will not only provide employment for some thousands of men in the chemical and subsidiary industries, but also in the other industries which will be fostered as the schemes With the expansion of the enterprise, develop. there will follow the construction of roads, railways, and other means of transport; there will be increased shipping to the ports; construction of houses, warehouses, buildings, wharves, and shipping Automatically, the employment of facilities. thousands of workers of all grades, from directors down to labourers, will be followed by a stimulus to all trades or professions engaged in the production of necessities, luxuries, and recreations for the different grades of workers.

37

617

9

RECORD

There will thus be increased employment and increased revenue to the country from the provision of food, clothes, houses, health (doctors, welfare-centres, etc.), places of worship, amusement, etc. Furthermore, the provision lowally of cheap fertilisers will stimulate agriculture, and be a means of restoring fertility to the land - especially so, if

certain schemes for irrigation be adopted.

Moreover, these lands are indeed fortunate, in that they contain vast resources of KEY SUBSTANCES, such as OIL, FERTILISER MATERIALS, GOLD, and MAGNESIUM minerals which are essential to present-day civilisation. They also contain RADIO_ACTIVE elements. Furthermore, the physical structure of Palestine is such that there are engineering possibilities for the large-scale production of cheap hydro-electric power needed for industrial purposes, transport, etc.

The path to prosperity thus clearly lies in the effective initiation of industries in Falestine, and proposals to that end were placed before His Majesty's Government by a British Group, of which I was a Member, as soon as the British Armed Forces began to free the regions from Turkish control.

VI. THE FATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERINY OF FALESTINE INDICATED IN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES FIRST LAID BEFORE H.M.GOVERNMENT DURING 1917-1918.

VI. THE PATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF PALESTINE INDICATED <u>IN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES FIRST LAID BEFORE H.M.</u> <u>GOVEENMENT DURING 1917-1918.</u>


'10

During the first World-War, there was an a cute shortage of Potash Salts and Fertilisers, as supplies from Germany were unavailable. In preparation for that War, and her bid for World Power, Germany had secured a World Potash Monopoly through the fact that she was the main producer of Potash Salts and Fertilisers, having extensive deposits of Potash and other minerals at depth below her soil, which were mined and processed by the Kali Syndikat, one of the most powerful organisations in the world.

In the course of my War work, I was brought face-toface with the fact that agriculture was suffering from an acute shortage of potash fertilisers. In order, therefore, if possible, to ease the position, and free the world's farming industry from a continuance of such monopolistic control, and a recurrence of war-time Potash starvation, I made intensive investigations as to the possibility of obtaining accesss to, and securing the development of another source of Potash minerals.

As a result, I came to the conclusion that in Palestine and Transjordan, there lay fallow what is perhaps the greatest source of Potash in the world, and that, at depth below the Potash-bearing strata, there exists an extensive Oilfield which was awaiting test-drilling. Furthermore, these countries possessed other mineral resources which could form the basis of industries of world-wide importance, provided the Oilfield was developed, and a cheap source of hydro-electric power was made available. Here, again, Nature had provided these countries with the requisite geological and physical formations to meet these requirements.

My findings and proposals regarding such developments were included in a comprehensive scheme for the development of Palestine which was worked out during 1917-1918 (and improved upon later) by a British Group of Civil, Chemical,




and Electrical Engineers, with myself as the Scientific Member of the Group. Our schemes included proposals for:-

(i) The irrigation of the Jordan Valley:

(ii) The development of a cheap and plentiful supply of hydro-electric power by bringing sea-water from the Mediterranean to the edge of the Jordan Valley, and precipitating it over the cliffs into the Valley (a drop of 700 feet). The sea-water thus employed for power-production was then to be directed down the Jordan Valley into the Dead Sea, which, under the irrigation scheme, would be deprived of the constant inflow of water from the River Jordan.

We also proposed to obtain hydro-electric power from the Biver Jordan itself, and from the water-fall which is situated in the Wadi Mojeb, some threequarters of a mile from the Eastern shore of the Dead Sea, as temporary installations for use until the sea-water project could be put into operation:

/(iii) The




37

3

janak.

RECORD



- 7 -

1

5

617

9

and (iv) The test-drilling and development of the Dead Sea Region, which has long been considered to be the most promising section of the extensive oilfield which exists in these lands. This Oil would be a great asset to Palestine and Transjor_dan, which need indigenous sources of fuel. It would also be of inestimable service to the proposed industries.

In the summer of 1918, the British Government expressed itself satisfied with our proposals, and offered to furnish a considerable part of the requisite capital, provided a Commission of Experts, whom we were sending to Palestine to carry out surveys and other investigations, including test-drilling in a certain locality for deposits of Oil and Potash minerals, should report favourably upon our findings. But, owing to the imminence of the Armistice, the Foreign Office withheld the necessary passports.

Thereafter, we repeatedly applied for permission to put our scheme of development into effect, but, for one reason or another, we were not allowed to commence our proposed operations.

After the Armistice, the Government seemed uninterested in the importance of our scheme to the economic development of Palestine, a country into which some hundreds of thousands of immigrants have poured since it came under British control, and a country which has become of strategic, political, and commercial significance.



A policy of delay, if not of obstruction, was pursued in dealing with these matters, and our findings were discounted as over-statements of fact, and over-optimistic in outlook. Unfortunately, the technical nature of the facts concerning the Palestine resources and their development limits their circulation to a very small section of the general public. Wherefore, any such interests as might be in opposition to the large-scale development of the Palestine resources have, hitherto, been able to belittle their colossal worth, and have even denied their existence.

As a result of this policy, the development of Palestine has been retarded, and the picture of the country's resources has been distorted. The existence of the Palestine Oilfield and of the vast subterranean deposits of Potash Fertiliser minerals has been kept from public knowledge.

Although some thirty years have elapsed since our comprehensive schemes were first placed before H.M.Government, the proposed large-scale development of OIL, POWER, and FERTILISERS, the extraction of GOID, and the establishment of Magnesium and other important subsidiary industries, are still in abeyance.

/ Attention

Attention has been focussed upon (1) the production of hydro-electric power from installations erected in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee and the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Valleys and (2) the extraction of Potash and other salts from the solar evaporation of Dead Sea Brine++. However, as indicated under (ii) and (iii) above, with our wide knowledge of the resources of the country, we regarded these developments as merely temporary expedients, until ample and cheap hydro-electric power was developed from the sea-water project, and until the subterranean deposits of Potash minerals were mined and processed quickly, as in the German Potash Industry.


From the evidence before me, I am in a position to state that the effective development of Palestine has, hitherto, been blocked or delayed because such developments did not accord with the commercial or political policies of certain Cartels and other powerful international interests.

VII. <u>VESTED INTERNESTS versus THE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT</u> OF KEY INDUSTRIES IN PALESTINE.

Palestine and Transjordan contain what is perhaps one of the greatest sources of mineral wealth in the world. Their resources of OIL, POTASH and GOLD are colossal.

In a Memorandum on the proposed industrial development of the Dead Sea Region which was submitted to the League of Nations in January 1930, I wrote as follows:-

> "The commercial exploitation of the mineral resources "of the Dead Sea Pegion is illimitable; and, if "kept free from the direct or indirect control of "powerful Chemical Cartels and other vested "interests that are, naturally, opposed to its "unrestricted development, will prove to be perhaps "the greatest industrial romance of the world's "history."



At that time, few people were aware of the existence of international Cartels, let alone their ramifications and control of prices and production in various industries.


During the recent War, however, considerable publicity was given to the activities of certain International Cartels, which, being in effect German-controlled, were holding up War production on account of their Cartel agreements. Oil and Chemical interests were also implicated, keeping each other informed of discoveries and inventions.

Germany had forged for herself a powerful weapon in her virtual control of the world's Chemical Market. She made it her business to be kept informed of any discoveries of mineral or chemical resources likely to be developed in competition with her industries, and took steps to prevent or control or limit any such developments.

/Germany

22

(1) Rutenberg Concession of 1921 ++ +(2) Novinesky Tullo h Concession of 1930



37

3

-

RECORD

Germany was informed that one of her Cartel Associates in their search for Oil in Palestine, under Ottoman Permis de Recherche, had drilled through beds of Potash Fertiliser Minerals (Carnallite) at depth.

13

37

617


9

B

German influence, in the past, was far-reaching and cunningly disguised. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the light of the above discovery, attempts to drill for Oil since 1918 have been discouraged or blocked on one pretext or another. For, such drilling in certain localities would inevitably bring to public knowledge the existence of deposits of Carnallite and other mineralised salts which, if mined, might form the basis of a Potash and a Chemical Industry capable of competing with the German Chemical Industry.

The German Potash Syndicate feared the development of any such deposits, but it has never been perturbed by the development of a Potash Industry based upon the evaporation of surface brines such as Searlies Lake or the Dead Sea. In any case, as the Dead Sea operating Company, in 1936, joined the German-controlled European Potash Cartel, in agreements as to output, quotas, and prices, there was no fear of competition from this source.

Evidence also exists that the major Oil Companies, prior to the settlement of their share in the Oilfield of Iraq, vied with each other for the possession of the Palestine Oilfield. Thereafter, and until I had proceeded to Palestine in 1934 to take up permits to which I was entitled under the Mining Laws to search for Oil, these Companies adopted an attitude of apparent indifference to the Palestine Oilfield, while, at the same time, succeeding in discouraging those who might be willing to finance independent drilling. While I was in Falestine, there was a conference between H.M.Government and a representative of the Oil interests on the subject of Thereafter, Oil exploration in the Palestine Oilfield. Palestine was officially suspended pending the enactment of fresh Oil Mining legislation. Under the new Ordinance of 1938 the Iraq Petroleum Company was given control of the Palestine Oilfield. But, although supplies of Oil were badly needed in the Mediterranean during the War, no War-time drilling was countenanced by H.M.Government. It is known that, for commercial reasons, the Iraq Petroleum Company has not hitherto wanted Palestine Oil on the market. Nor did Germany want a Potash Mining Industry started in Palestine in competition with the Kali Syndikat, for, apart from other reasons, the interest on the £15,000,000 German Potash Loan floated internationally, was guaranteed by the sales of German Potash in the British Market and elsewhere.



Furthermore, there has, so far, been no extraction of Gold, so badly needed in these days, from the waters of the Dead Sea. Incidentally, such extraction was definitely prohibited in the terms of the Dead Sea Salts Concession.

VIII. THE EFF COIVE DEVELOPMENT OF KEY INDUSTRIES IN PALESTINE IS A VITAL NECESSITY TO THE POST-WAR WORLD.


In view of the present World position; of the acute shortage of Potash Fertilisers; of the growing call for Magnesium Metal; of the need for Oil; and the urgent necessity of bringing prosperity to Palestine and Transjordan, the policy of holding up the effective development of the /resources, resources, and of profitable Industries in these countries may well have to be abandoned.

In particular, a Potash Mining Industry is essential to remedy the Potash position. The Dead Sea Salts Industry, for technical reasons, will be unable to cope with the acute world shortage of Potash Fertilisers, which will continue for years to come. It is certain that the production of Potash in Europe will be inadequate to meet the export demands. The Alsatian and Polish Potash Mines were deliberately and systematically sabotaged by the Germans in the days of their defeat and withdrawal. The German Potash Mines, however, were captured by the Allies in good working order; but, as about sixty per cent of Germany's Potash Mining Industry is now within the Russian zone of influence, there will be only about thirty per cent of the pre-War German output available for distribution throughout the world.

America, having sought for and developed deposits of Foush mineral salts, is well on its way to become independent of European supplies of Potash. Had the British Government but allowed our proposals of 1915 to have gone forward, there would have been no Potash problem for us to-day, and Falestine and Transjordan would have benefited largely therefrom, and from the exploitation of their Oilfield.

In view of the nature of the Bretton Woods Agreement, H.M.Government may change its policy also in respect of the production of Gold.

Since first I became interested in these matters, it has been my contention that, owing to the significance of the Palestine resources in world politics, their development and utilisation should not be left to commercial interests, but should be unter Government control, so that the countries themselves shall becefit adequately therefrom. The presence of Radio-activity, and the use to which radio-active elements



have been put in time of War, perhaps calls for such control to be placed under the trusteeship of a United Nations Organisation.

> (Signed) A. HOMER, M.A., Sc.D., F.R.I.C., etc. 89, Onelow Gardens, London, S.W. 7.

30/1/46.

24

37

-

5

~1

9

Tstephonez Keusington 6520. Wer 25 12 20th October 1947 5 OCT 1947 To:- The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M. P., P.C. 2210 Secretary of State for Foreign Por Foreign · bik mel he for ealin upp 2. buste Aupli p.15 10. Affairs, Downing Street. London S.W.1. Sir, GHT Herewith, I have the honour to 9 send you a duplicate of a letter to THE you which was to-day delivered to the Foreign Office by hand, as it occurs PUBLIC to me that you may be glad to have a spare copy for reference or discussion. 371 RECORD T have the honour to be, Sir. OFFICE, Your obedient servant, 61792 A- Homer, (A.Homer)M.A.,Sc.D., F.R.T.C.etc LONDON Two enclosures

alistin E9849 /G EASTERN <u>_____</u> E9849746/C 2 01 104 Palesine : Discussions monute. New York 2954 dates it out Received 22 Dei. Last Paper. (Minutes.) E9466 NOW See E9856 / 4-References. Refer COPYRI GHT JBOUT.23 THE PUBLIC RECORD (Print.) 371 OFFICE (How disposed of.) 6179 Amanded dies. LONDC NOT def-Lee て Te)New /ork 3067 20005. Tes New York 355 B Cas (Action completed.) (Inđ¢x.) WH 6 Next Paper. 30047 F.O.F.

E.S.

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 18.10.47. [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be

retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

Kefere;

ಲ

~1

617

9

て

RECORD

OFF

2

FROM NEW YORK TO FORKIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2954D. 4.30 p.m. 17th October, 1947.17th October, 1947.R. 11.45 p.m. 17th October, 1947.


Repeated to : High Commissioner. Jerusalen

TOTOLATY

SECRET

Following personal for Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. from Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Committee set up by the Assembly to consider the Palestine question has finished its general discussion. Yesterday I again put our views and emphasised our early withdrawal and the importance that the parties should move to some accommedation or the United Nations find a solution. I also emphasised that any scheme adopted must provide for a substitute authority and that the question of implementing and enforcing the scheme must be dealt with as an integral part of the problem. I further explained why the United Kingdom is unable to recommend any particular solution. I reputiated suggestions that the United Hingdom was concerned with provocative measures in the Middle Bast, warned the governments of connivance in illegal immigration and pleaded that the whole problem of displaced persons in Europe be dealt with. I also replied to the American assumption that United Kingdom would continue to administer Palestine throughout the transi-



tion period.

2. We have been well supported by the Commonwealth Governments except that they have urged a settlement on the basis of partition which is the dominant view here.

5. The Arab attitude has remained intransigent and there is no sign here that they are prepared to discuss any accommodation. The Jews appear ready to work out some arrangement with the Arabs and the United Nations on the basis of partition and are anxious to restore better relations with the United Kingdom. Both the Palestine Arabs and Jewish Agency will now make statements. Many resolutions concerning procedure have been tabled and these are being classified and will probebly result in the appointment of sub-committees.

(Foreign Office

(Foreign Office and Colonial Office only.)

4. I feel that the limit of my immediate usefulness over here will be exhausted next week and our experts and advisers can well carry on, certainly during the next stages. If necessary I can return later but meantime our position is well covered, though it would be well for me to inform other delegations of my temporary withdrawal. I would propose therefore to return to England (where many important and urgent matters await me) at the end of next week. I hope I have your consent to this course. [Ends]

13

Reference:-

371


COPYRIGHT OF


THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,


Please pass copy to Colonial Office, and repeat paragraphs 1 to 3 to High Commissioner, Jerusalem, personal and Secret from Secretary of State for the Colonies, as my telegram No. 98.

[Copies sent to Parliamentary Undersecretary, Colonial Office, and Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem.]

111







Cypher/OTP

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2954D. 4.30 p.m. 17th October, 194717th October, 1947R.11.45 p.m. 17th October, 1947

Repeated to High Commissioner, Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Following personal for Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary from Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Committee set up by the Assembly to consider the Palestine question has finished its general discussion. Yesterday I again put our views and emphasised our early withdrawal and the importance that the parties should move to some accommodation or the United Nations find a solution. I also emphasised that any scheme adopted must provide for a substitute authority and that the question of implementing and enforcing the scheme must be dealt with as an integral part of the problem. I further explained why the United Kingdom is unable to recommend any particular solution. repudiated suggestions that the United Kingdom was concerned with provocative measures in the Middle East, warned the Governments of connivance in illegal immigration and pleaded that the whole problem of displaced persons in Europé be dealt I also replied to the American assumption that United with. Kingdom would continue to administer Palestine throughout the transition period.

2. We have been well supported by the Commonwealth Governments except that they have urged a settlement on the

basis of partition which is the dominant view here.

3. The Arab attitude has remained intransigent and there is no sign here that they are prepared to discuss any accommodation. The Jews appear ready to work out some arrangement with the Arabs and the United Nations on the basis of partition and are anxious to restore better relations with the United Kingdom. Both the Palestine Arabs and Jewish Agency will now make statements. Many resolutions concerning procedure have been tabled and these are being classified and will probably result in the appointment of sub-committees.

[Foreign Office and Colonial Office only].

4. I feel that the limit of my immediate usefulness over here will be exhausted next week and our experts and advisers can well carry on, certainly during the next stages.

If

THE

PUBLIC

RECORD

OFFICE,

LONDO

37

51

-1

9

て

If necessary I can return later but meantime our position is well covered, though it would be well for me to inform other delegations of my temporary withdrawal. I would propose therefore to return to England (where many important and urgent matters await me) at the end of next week. I hope I have your consent to this course. [Ends].

- 2 -


31

Please pass copy to Colonial Office, and repeat paragraphs 1 to 3 to High Commissioner Jerusalem, Personal and Secret from Secretary of State for the Colonies as my telegram No.98.

[Copies sent to Prime Minister, Colonial Office and Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

k k k






COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

LONDON

Reference

(

371



OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

luiter 33

Refere

371

61792

COPYRIGHT

0F

THE PUBLIC

RECORD

OFFICE,

LONDON

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

<u>No. 3553</u> 18th October, 1947 D. 7.07 p.m. 18th October, 1947

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Personal for Secretary of State for Colonies from Foreign Secretary.

2. Your telegram No. 2954 [of October 17th: Palestine].

I shall be seeing the Prime Minister tomorrow and will consult with him regarding your return. Meanwhile, may I congratulate you on your statement of October 16th, which I read carefully and also heard in extract over the wireless. It came across very well on the air.

uuuuu



Registry No, P.D. Draft UKDEL. NEW YORK Telegram No.356 CypherMARGIN. PRISEC. THIS Ζ TEN WRIT ВП 6

U

Z


NOTH

IMMEDIATE SECRET.

Following personal for Secretary of State for Colonies from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2954 /of October 17th: Palestin<u>e</u>7

We realise that you would like to be at home with Parliament resuming and appreciate that you do not wish to stay on in New York if affairs there do not warrant it. We are doubtful whether it would be wise to leave just yet. For your own private information indications are reaching us here that moves on the Arab side may be brewing. If the Jews are nervous we think that the Arabs are too. These moves may come to something when a vote has been taken on the principle. there were a two-thirds majority in favour of the partition plan, Arabs and Jews, or ohe of the parties might appeal to us in some way and we might even get a settlement. If matters were to work out in this way it might well be that we should have some suggestions for you to put to the parties in New York. Our feeling therefore is that you would be well advised not to leave New York, at any rate until after a vote has been taken on the principle.



2. If you do have to leave, we think that Cadogan with all his experience should take charge of the Palestine question, assuming that Hector has enough on his plate already. 3. We feel sure that you will think it wise to be very cautious in any dealings you

have with the Syrian Khouri.

₩ S

[Copies sent to Prime ministro]


MARGIN. THIS Z WRITTEN BE 0 G

37

-

ECO

RO



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/01P

DIPLOMATIC SECRET.

COPYRIGHT

0

RECORD

OFFI

CE,

Reference:

37

ဘ

1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3567.

20th October 1947. D. 11.40 a.m. 20th October 1947.

IMMEDIATE. TOP SECRET.

DEYOU.


Following personal for Secretary of State for the Colonies from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2954 [of October 17th: Palestine].

The realise that you would like to be at home with Parliament resuming and appreciate that you do not wish to stay on in New York if affairs there do not warrant it. But we are doubtful whether it would be vise for you to leave just yet. For your ewn private information indications are reaching us here that moves on the Arab side may be brewing. If the Jews are nervous we think that the Arabs are too. These moves may come to something when a vote has been taken on the principle. If there were a two-thirds majority in favour of the partition plan, Arabs and Jews, or one of the parties, might appeal to us in some way and we might even get a settlement. If matters were to work out in this way it might well be that we should have some suggestions for you to put to the parties in New York. Our feeling therefore is that you would be well advised not to leave New York at any rate until after a vote has been taken on the principle.


2. If you do have to leave, we think that Cadogan with all his experience should take charge of the Palestine question, assuming that Hector has enough on his plate already.


3. We feel sure that you will think it wise to be very cautious in any dealings you have with the Syrian Khouri.



E9850 /G alestina 1 2 4 2001 194 EASTERN 118 Palesine: Possible action by E9850 1 46 14 ex - Mufi Bein 769 daied 20 00 Received 22 De. Last Paper. (Minutes.) E9849 Mi walker hs. Beins Ort. 23 References. Then seems tobe little doubt that in E 9639 951 31 Days Amy will at least be prepared for E9713/49/31 intervention in Paletine intralue, . (M.T.WALKER) 23100 37 (Print.) Kna. 2 conflicts with para. 3 of annan (How disposed of.) 617 ltl: no: 306 (attached). Van indined to wunder whether, when it cames 03. 9 to the baint, the beag; any will do much in Palestine - whether, in fact, they will do more than cend a loten force. 24/2 (Index.) (Action completed.) 24·4 14/14. 10 Next Paper. 30047 F.O.P.

E9850 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] DIPLOMATIC(SECRET Cypher/OTP FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE D. 5.20 p.m. 20th October, 1947. Mr. Evans, No.769 R. 7.58 p.m. 20th October, 1947. 20th October, 1947. Repeated to New York UKDEL. Cairo, B.M.E.O. Caire. Jerusalem, Bagdad, Dama scus, SAVING Amman, Jedda. TOP SECRET Palestine. Salch Jabr whom I saw on October 19th said to me that he was confident that the ex-Mufti would not (repeat not) start guerilla activities as long as British forces were in Palestine. I asked him if this would be the case if a decision unfavourable to the Arabs was reached by the United Nations Assembly, saying I had heard rumours to the effect that Arab irregulars might become active in such an





eventuality. He replied in the affirmative and said that the ex-Mufti had been warned that if he did not keep in

step with the Arab League, the responsibility would be his

and that he could not then count on help from the Arab

States. It had been agreed that the ex-Mufti's people

2. Saleh Jabr said that certain Iraqi units were being prepared for "manoeuvres" in Transjordan. Recalling paragraph 3 of Amman telegram No.306, I asked him whether he had discussed this with King Abdullah. He replied that he had and that His Majesty had been generally in agreement. He reminded me that Iraqi-Transjordan treaty provided for close co-operation in the military field.

3. Speaking for the establishment of provisional Palestinian Government which would be set up under the auspices of the Arab League - please see paragraph 4 of my telegram No.760 - he said that the Jews would be invited to participate on a proportional basis. Arab Governments would do everything possible to protect the Jews with whom they were anxious there should, if possible, be no clash.

4./....

4. Saleh Jabr appeared more cheerful than when I last saw him (after statement of American policy) and he seemed not unhopeful that a sufficient number of States in the United Nations Assembly would either vote against aiding U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations or abstain and thus secure their rejection.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York as my telegram No.40, and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.200.

[Repeated to UKDEL New York].

ର୍ତ୍ତ୍

39

COPYRIGHT

ĐF

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

LONDO

Reference:

371

61792

E9856 /G Westing 10 (n. 1947 EASTERN 119 E9856 /46/9 Palestine. Presence 7-colonial Secretary in NewYork. New York 3003 عمتجه معتمد Received 22000. Last Paper. (Minutes.) E9850 Some taging 1 GF hs. Beins ort, 23 References. 8 Refer E9849/46/2. 0 (Print.) 371 RECORD OFFICE, (How disposed of.) 6179 2700. 3)C.0 LONDO Te) New York 3648 て 25005 27005. 8)C.0 Ter New York 3654 25005 24005 8)C.0 ~ (Action completed.) (Index.) Next Paper. ~ 30047 F.O.P.

Equit

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should We 1947 retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]. [1]

Cypher OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

<u>No. 3003</u>

D. 8.35 p.m. 21st October 1947.

21st October 1947. R. 1.40 p.m. 21st October 1947.

TOP SECRET

Personal from Colonial Secretary for Prime Minister and Forcign Secretary.

[Begins]

Your telegram No. 3567.

I appreciate your view and will stay as long as seems necessary. I am anxious about Colonial Office affairs including Development Corporation Bill, Ceylon, Governors' Conference, Malaya and other urgent matters but I realise the importance of nothing going amiss at United Nations regarding Palestine. Creech Jones.

[Ends].


[Copies sent to the Prime Minister, Foreign Scoretary and Colonel Rees-Williams, Colonial Office].

E		
- <u>3</u>		
	8	
Reference:-	PYRIGH	
Ť	T OF TH	
O	COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.	
37	I C RECO	
1	RD OFF	
61	1 CE. 1	





P.D.



V. K. Delution NEW MORK.


IMMEDIATE. TOP SECRET.

No Cypher Date Diplomatic Secret.

For concurrence of Prime Minister. Read 11. rep.tw. 24/x. f.

Your telegram No.3003 /of October 21st: Colonial Secretary and Palestine/ Personal for Colonial Secretary from the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. We fully realise what a number of tasks are awaiting you at home and how inconvenient it is for you to be away. We are not clear from your telegrams Nos. 3021 and 3031 when the question of principle will come up, but gather that matters are not likely to come to a head just yet. We therefore feel that you should be free to come home whenever you

judge the moment opportune. You will no doubt determine your actual date of departure



in the light of developments of the Palestine situation which you are much better able to assess than ourselves.

2. We should like to know whether in your absence Cadogan will be in charge of the Palestine question.





E9856/46

43

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

P.D.

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEE YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

<u>No. 3648</u>

Cypher/OTP

25th October 1947. D. 3.7 a.m. 25th October 1947.


IMMEDIATE. TOP SECRET.

Your telegram No. 3003 [of October 21st: Colonial Secretary and Calestine].

Personal for Colonial Secretary from the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.


We fully realise what a number of tasks are awaiting you at home and how inconvenient it is for you to be away. We are not clear from your telegram Nos. 3021 and 3031 when the question of principle will come up, but gather that matters are not likely to come to a head just yet. We therefore feel that you should be free to come home whenever you judge the moment opportune. You will no doubt determine your actual date of departure in the light of developments of the Palestine situation which you are much better able to assess than ourselves.

1 1 1 1 1 Reference: FO 371 61792	
COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON	




2. Te should like to know whether in your absence Cadogan will be in charge of the Palestine question.

vvv



E Registry No. EQBS6469 1947 HA Ôct. Top Secret. Secret. [TEL + 5 Alm 1 240 Confidential. Immediate Rescricted. See See Ser distin Open. My Sunt off in Sir -Draft. My Let. No 3648 [goch 25 U.K. Dele fation MARGIN. from Colonial Scentary's celum New Mat. New York] Personal por Colonial Sec. pour S.g.S. Tel. No. 3654 De Monisla geste's message in Delegation tel. Cypher v er U.S. that The No. 3062 shows 37 Dip- Sever Jev. have something to say on Palestine Krugh Danglas 6179 who returned to London て NOTH how has I feel it would be rong to have Resimble ta me your assistance at This End. So I hope tent, of you druide you able will be ym leave, Can

45 to echirm ny Soon. 40 Pm E. N Ś MARGIN. G 9 THIS COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON Reference: Z WRITTEN 371 BE **0 1**0 6179 NOTHING



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Top Secret

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

46

Reference:-

.

37

-

617

9

COPYRIGHT

0F

THE

CYPHER /OTP

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3,654. D: 8.30 p.m.25th October,1947. 25th October, 1947.


IND/JED LATE

TOP SECRET

My telegram No. 3,648 [of October 25th: Colonial Secretary's return from New York].

Personal for Colonial Secretary from Secretary of State.

The Minister of State's message in Delegation telegram No. 3,062 shows that the United States Government have something to say on Palestine through Douglas, who has now returned to London. I feel it would be very




br3 141 E_9858 1947 PALESTINE 22 OCT arrest of five armed tear by kyrian. Registry Number } E 9858 46 31 Riken Damascer til 82 ti sereralem (E 9779/40/51) Britisk Anepeoter of Police, was prevented by remeder. TELEGRAM FROM M'Dundas General flatice from seeing arnest of men No. Mikenel and Miller of Saterios that if Lews and Identified as alice they will be returned with Nama/cus Minuter of Dated forth arrend 459 Received Received in Registry auxiliary ralid 21 Dot 610 prontier. over OUND 22 . ADARLISCO TERUSALEM 84 Last Paper. (Minutes.) 9856 he Beins Nt. 24 References. this is all scaled now HB at. 28 PUBLIC RECORD 37 (Print.) OFFICE (How disposed of.) 617 LOND Upathen of 9 て Bol-23 B) Palestine kegy C.O. (Clunch House) (with Egy179/46/31) 3) et 23 (Index.) (Action completed.) Next Paper. E 9864 Wt. 24772/717 17395 10/38 F.O.P.

• Cypher/OTP <u>DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1</u> 48 E	
Mr. Dundas No. 84 21st October, 1947 R. 6.35 p.m. 21st October, 1947	
Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 459 SECRET My telegram No. 82.	4
British Inspector of Police referred to was prevented by Director-General of Police from seeing areas for men. I saw Ministers of Defence and the Interior last night who both assured me that if the Jews are identified as auxiliary police they will be returned with their arms over the frontier.	
2. I have arranged by telephone for another British inspector from Palestine to make identification today.	
888 [Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]	



6-4 E 9864 49 E 23 OCT 1947 PALESTINE Paletine Rumian Pres Registry E 9864/46/31 Number E 9864/46/31 Refine Allascow depotch 448 (E5269/46/51) Pow inclosed further review from 'Aw times' of Oct. 8 of Borilier linums beek Bokind the helken curling institut by B. Danibersky FROM 6 Lanceny Alexeou, No. 403/108/47 Dated Received 12,00F in Registry 23 Last Paper (Minutes.) NA bept. Roal 1/XI Northern Sept. 981-8 References Batty Crumis brok is first up the Pussion alley 371 RECORD (Print)Bort. 24 OFFICE 61792 (How disposed of) ON DO



BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW. (403/108/47)12th, October 1947. 9864 5 2 69/41/31 Dear Department 23 OCT Moscow despatch No. 448 of June 12th forwarded the translation of a Soviet review of Bartley Cram's book "Behind the Silken Curtain". COPYRI GHT We now enclose a further review from New Times of October 8th which imputes to the State Department and Foreign Office the wilful 0F intention of steering the Committee of Enquiry THE away from an objective study of all the facts. Cram is given good marks only for his criticism PUBLIC of United States and the Americans, not for his ideas on Palestine. 37 RECORD You will doubtless notice the recurrence in the penultimate paragraph of the theme that -Palestine is the battleground where a stubborn OFFICE, fight is being waged between the rival claims of 61792 British imperialism and American economic, political and military expansion. LON DON

We are sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Washington, Jerusalem and New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office. LEW TIMES

BOOK REVIEWS

Behind the Scenes of Anglo-American Co-operation

B. DANILEVSKY

BARTLEY Crum was one of the six American members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. He has now published a book* recounting the first-hand experience he gained in that capacity of the inner workings of British and American diplomacy. A San Francisco corporation lawyer, Mr. Crum was a close collaborator of President Roosevelt. In the presidential elections of 1944 he was the national chairman of the Independent Republicans who supported Roosevelt. He performed a number of important missions for the late president. In 1945 he was consultant to the American delegation at the San Francisco conference, where he worked on the United Nations Charter.

"When you want to avoid deciding a question, set up a committee," Clemenceau once said. This was the principle on which British Prime Minister Attlee acted when, at the end of 1945, President Truman, deferring to the demands of American Jewry, asked him to allow 100,000 Jewish displaced persons from the camps of Western Europe to enter Palestine. Attlee suggested the formation of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The committee consisted of six Britons and six Americans, of which Bartley C. Crum was one. It inaugurated its inquiries in Washington, continued them in London, visited the British, American and French zones of occupation of Germany, and then transferred its labours to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. It heard the testimony of hundreds of witnesses, experts and representatives of public organizations, and then retreated to Switzerland where in the course of four weeks it worked on the framing of its recommendations.

When Crum first arrived in Washington to take up his work on the committee, he was given an inkling of the line of action expected of him by Loy Henderson, Chief of the Near East Division of the State Department. Henderson took him aside and told him:

1947

"'There is one fact facing both the United States and Great Britain, Mr. Crum. That is the Soviet Union. It would be wise to bear that in mind when you consider the Palestine problem." (P. 8.)

Crum was surprised to hear this. But he only began to ponder on it seriously later, when he compared Henderson's broad hint with what representatives of the British Foreign Office insistently tried to impress upon him. And what they impressed upon him was this:


"British policy was based on the protection of British interests against Russia... and it should be in our (America's) interests to fall in with that policy." (P. 8.)

The committee sailed from New York to London on the Queen Elizabeth. On board, Harold Beeley, a member of the British Foreign Office, tried to convince Crum of the necessity to establish an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire in the Middle East. And as the ship neared English shores the proselytizing talks on this subject became ever more lengthy and outspoken. Their general tone is summed up by Crum as follows:

"The majority of my British colleagues were anti-Russian, their attitudes so strong as to be almost a phobia.... It was Anglo-American unity they desired, not so much to solve the problem before us, but rather to establish a bloc against the Soviets." (P. 35.)

However, some of the Americans on the committee held a different view:

"We realized, I think, that the Soviet and the system it chose to follow were both in the world and that we had to live with both, like it or not. If we travelled different roads, each still had much to learn from the other. The world was large enough for both, and the market place, not the battlefie'd, should be the testing place of ideas." (P. 35.)



^{*} Behind the Silken Curtain. A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East. By Bartley C. Crum. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1947.

NEW TIMES

tions shall be raised from my side. If due to illness or other reasons I should not b_e on the spot when the time comes to pay fines and other fees for failure to meet rent payments, all my obligations will be assumed unconditionally by my sponsor Miki Itsiro."

This contract is a striking reflection of the appalling conditions under which the Japanese peasantry labour. From the contract it is clear that the landowner undertakes no obligations whatsoever. If tenant Kawasaki should take ill and die by the time the rent is due landowner Osumi would lose nothing. Sponsor Miki, Kawasaki's neighbour, who is a poor tenant farmer like all the other inhabitants of Hiraoka village, would have to meet the payments.

The landowner has the right to raise the rent and to levy additional payments and fines on the peasants. Crop failures due to drought, typhoons or floods do not concern the landowner. He extorts his land rents from the peasants no matter what happens. Incidentally, the Tokyo district this year has had its worst drought in 80 years. In a number of prefectures as much as half of the rice crop perished.

The landlord charges a percentage for each day of arrears in payment of rentals. At any time of the year he can reclaim the land he has leased. Last, but not least, the landowner has the right to black-list a tenant for irregular payment of rent. This black list is sent • out to all the landowners in the prefecture, and the peasants whose names figure on it will

not be able to lease any land in that area. This mode of land tenure which has existed

* for decades still persists in the Japanese countryside. Moreover, land rents have risen since the war ended. In some cases the rent is as much as 63 per cent of the harvest. A great many Japanese sharecroppers are up to their ears in debt to the landowner for years on end and are to all intents and purposes his slaves.

In any Japanese village you will see fruit trees on tenant farmer's land with the fallen fruit rotting on the ground. We were told that according to local custom the peasant has no right to pick up the fruit without the permission of the landowner. If a peasant leases a plot of land with a small orchard on it he has no right to use the fallen fruit for food until he has paid his rent in full. And in the meantime his family starves.

 \sim

The evil forces of old that brought immense misery on the country are still ruling the Japanese countryside. An acute food crisis prevails in towns and villages. We visited shops in Tokyo, Yokohama and other cities. The local inhabitants rarely enter them. The shops have neither food products nor other necessities. On the open market, however, speculators offer all kinds of products and articles in unlimited quantities at fabulous prices. One of the black markets flourishes in Ginze Street, one of the busiest Tokyo thoroughfares, where every kind of trade proceeds daily.

The population of Japan is suffering from hunger and want not because the country is unable to produce enough food, but because the policy of the Japanese government hinders democratic reforms which would spur the development of agriculture. Moreover, the government does not take measures to insure the efficient harvesting of the crop and the proper distribution of available food supplies. There are considerable stocks of rice and other products in the country, but these stocks lie buried. They have been hidden by the wealthy peasants and landowners who are waiting for the market prices to rise still higher.


Barter is conducted on a big scale in the Tokyo valley between the well-to-do population of Tokyo and Yokohama and the prosperous sections of the population of villages situated in the vicinity of the large towns. Speculators are making huge profits. And in the meantime the workers in the cities and the majority of the peasants in the villages are starving.

Driving past the village of Torizawa one day we witnessed a scene that was extremely typical of rural life in Japan today. Two weary peasants with sun-parched faces harnessed to a wooden plough pushed from behind by a third were trudging laboriously over the field. That, no doubt, was how the land was cultivated five hundred years ago. That is how it is being cultivated today.

Feudal survivals still weigh heavily on the country's agriculture. And when this is combined with modern methods of capitalist exploitation, the result is that state of stagnation and regress which is characteristic of the Japanese village today. The two years that have elapsed since the surrender have brought about practically no changes.

g(x) = g(x) + 0

×.



N. EW TIMES

This is the view of those American business circles that do not approve of the reckless plans for world supremacy preached by the advocates of a new war. But whatever illusions Crum may have had on this score were exploded while the committee was still on its way to London by a landmine in the shape of a document distributed to its members on the Queen Elizabeth. It was marked:

"Contents of file of confidential communications on Palestine supplied by Division of Near Eastern Affairs (State Department) for use of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry." (P. 36.)

From these communications the members of the committee learned some astonishing things. The confidential documents revealed with cynical frankness the double-dealing of the State Department on the Palestine question.

"It revealed that steadily and successively we had made public promises to the Zionists and private promises to the Arabs." (P. 37.)

Every time a United States official spokesman had declared in favour of setting up a Jewish state in Palestine, the State Department promptly sent confidential messages to the Arab rulers explaining that the public statements meant nothing at all.

In October 1944 Roosevelt had sent a personal letter to Senator Wagner to be read before the Convention of the Zionist organizations of America. In his statement Roosevelt reiterated the plank of the Democratic Party adopted at its convention in that year proclaiming in favour of unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that country. Roosevelt promised that efforts would be made to effectuate this policy. But when the Prime Minister of Iraq requested an explanation from the State Department, the latter sent a secret cable assuring him that the President's statement referred to "possible action at some future date," and that Washington was "keeping in mind the assurance made to certain Near East governments" that nothing would be done without consultation with the Arabs.

On August 16, 1945, Truman had publicly stated that he had discussed the Palestine question with Churchill and Attlee at Potsdam, and that they had agreed to let as many Jews into Palestine as possible. But on October 23 the State Department sent a confidential cable to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut and Jidda, explaining that the American President and the British Prime Minister had only "engaged in exploratory correspondence on this subject and naturally mentioned Palestine as one of the havens for homeless Jews," and that there had been no change in the American government's attitude on Palestine. Similar reassurances were given to the Arab world by the State Department on November 15, 1945.

Bartley Crum was thunderstruck by what he learned from these confidential documents.

"This file confirmed the charges of double-dealing that had been hurled at both the United States and Great Britain. It was a sorry and bitter record for an American to read." (P. 37.)

Crum suggested to the American members of the committee that as soon as the ship arrived in England they should return home. "I don't see that there is any purpose in going on with our work," he said.


Different, however, was the attitude of the British members of the committee. "I found it painful," is Crum's comment. Sir Frederick Leggett "was almost amused." Sir John Singleton said dryly: "It appears that Great Britain is not the only power who promises the same thing to two different groups." And Labour M. P. Richard Crossman remarked to Crum that though he could not understand the stupidity that would permit the Americans to do a thing like that, nevertheless "I must say it pleases me to find the British and the Americans are in the same boat."

None of the American members of the committee climbed out of this "boat" on reaching British shores. All that was left for Crum was to enter into his diary the melancholy reflection:

"The over-all question is whether the Western democracies have moral integrity.... If they don't, I think the Middle East may become a breeding place of new wars." (P. 44.)

In London the committee was at once enveloped in a close web of police spying and surveillance. Crum begins his account of the committee's stay in England with the words: "Once in London I felt for the first time the strange sensation of being watched." Friends cautioned him to be careful to whom he spoke, and especially of what he said on the telephone: telephone conversations were being tapped and the American members of the committee were under surveillance. On his second day in London when Crum wanted to discuss certain ques-

27。





tions before the committee with a representative of a Jewish organization he preferred to meet him not in his hotel but "on a nearby corner." But even this meeting did not escape the British sleuths:

"The next morning one of my British colleagues met me with a smile. There was almost a chiding note in his voice. 'I understand you've been seeing some of our Jewish friends,' he said, and winked." (P. 46.)

To meet with people who wanted to convey information to Crum on Palestine matters he had to resort to complicated conspiratorial methods, about which he has many a colourful story to tell in his book.

In spite of British resistance the hearings of the committee in London were held in public.

"Public interest in the hearings seemed intense, as evidenced by the overflow attendance of spectators and the press gallery, which included nearly fifty reporters representing newspapers all over the world. But though I glanced through the London newspapers daily, I rarely found more than two or three paragraphs referring to our hearings and frequently nothing at all." (P. 48.)

Later Crum learned that "it was customary for the British Foreign Office to advise the press" on any matter it considered important. He thus received an object lesson in what the vaunted "freedom of the press" meant in Britain. His naive illusions were also soon to be shattered on another matter—the policy of the Labour Party.

At its annual conference in December 1944 this party had unequivocally declared in favour of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. What did the party intend to do about this pledge now that it was in power? This question was put at the committee's hearings to one of the Labour M.P.'s, Thomas Reid.

"Reid was forthright," Crum reports. "His party's pledges on Palestine had been highly overplayed, he told us." (P. 51.)

One of the British members of the committee, Wilfrid Crick, a banker, wanted to lend the tactless Labourite a helping hand. He asked him to explain to "our American friends" why the Labour Party, having come to power, could not consider itself bound by the decisions of its conferences and the pledges it had given the electors. He prompted Reid with a question:

"'Would you agree that it is not entirely without precedent that political parties, when they are faced with the responsibility of government, do sometimes qualify the policies they have expressed?" (P. 52.) But the reckless Labourite would not take the cautious hint. He answered bluntly:

"I am afraid it is worse than that. Sometimes political parties make promises which they do not at all carry out.... I do not think the committee need pay an enormous amount of attention to vague resolutions passed at Labour Party conferences."

To which Crum comments:

"Since the British Labour Party was elected on the basis of such resolutions, this struck me as unalloyed political cynicism." (P. 52.)

At a formal luncheon tendered by Bevin to the members of the Committee, the British Foreign Secretary declared that the British government would accept all the Committee's recommendations. But, Crum writes:

"When I charged publicly that Bevin had made this promise, the British Foreign Office stated that it had no record of it. There may be no record, for the press was excluded, but many members of the British Cabinet were there and heard his words." (P. 61.)


At one of the dinners given the Committee before leaving England Crum gathered "what was in the mind" of some of his British colleagues. The British plan was quite simple. Let the Committee make whatever recommendations it wished. Let it even decide that 100,000 Jewish refugees should be enabled to enter Palestine. The reply would be: "Very well, that will require six divisions of soldiers. Will the American government provide three?" The Americans would say, "No," and Britain would then declare that she was not able to bear alone the burden of the consequences. And everything would remain as of old.

"Some of us considered it a trap," Crum writes.

After visiting Western Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Egypt, the Committee proceeded to Palestine.

"If the atmosphere of intrigue and surveillance had been evident in London and Cairo, here it literally shouted at one," Crum says.... "After two days in Jerusalem I felt like a character in a Hollywood mystery film." (Pp. 161-163.)

Special pill boxes had been installed above the entrance of the hotel where the Committee stayed and on the roofs of nearby buildings; the elevator and stair entrances were guarded day and night by British soldiers armed with submachine guns; the vicinity of the hotel was enveloped in barbed wire, with machine



NEW TIMES



guns commanding all avenues of approach: tanks patrolled the street in front of the hotel. Agents of the British Criminal Investigation Department were assigned to each of the members of the Committee. When they went anywhere their cars were preceded by tanks equipped with mine detectors. The purpose of this display of military and police vigilance was clear:

"Every effort was made to impress upon us that we had come to a land on the brink of civil war between Jew and Arab." (P. 163.)

But in spite of all the exertions of the British authorities it became more and more evident to some of the American members of the Committee that Arab-Jewish enmity was artificially maintained only on the top levels, and that the masses of the two nationalities got on well together. Says Crum, summing up his impressions:

"The basic truth of Arab-Jewish life in Palestine is that political conflict on high levels does not affect the relations among the men on the street." (P. 229.)

Crum tried to ascertain on the spot how far the talk he had heard in London of the necessity of sending six divisions to Palestine was justified. He canvassed the opinion of no less a person than the British High Commissioner for Palestine, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham.

"I put a fundamental question frankly to him: would American troops be needed in Palestine if 100.000 Jews were admitted?

"Sir Alan shot a sharp glance at me.

"'No, sir,' he said. 'But I should not mind having a token squad of American troops here to show everyone that the United States is behind Britain in such a solution.'" (P. 225.)

The last stage of the Committee's itinerary was Switzerland. Here, in Lausanne, on the peaceful shores of Lake Leman, the Americans hoped to find surcease from spying and surveillance and to work in quiet on their "recommendations." But the tentacles of the British intelligence service reached out to them even in Switzerland. Captain Ayers, of the British Criminal Investigation Department, arrived specially for the purpose from Palestine. He would go through the rooms of the American delegates, and look through their papers. If anybody telephoned an American member of the Committee he would find Captain Ayers at the end of the wire demanding who was calling and from where. The Americans' mail was opened. Even telegrams from President Truman to Judge Hutcheson, the American chairman of the Committee, were first delivered to the British consul in Geneva, and the Americans got them unsealed.


No. 41

In Switzerland the Committee reviewed the results of its four months' investigation. The mountain gave birth to a mouse: the Committee rejected the proposal to create Jewish and Arab states in Palestine and recommended the continuation of the British mandate. It also declared in favour of admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. But this was categorically turned down by Attlee and Bevin. Crum puts the result in a nutshell:

"The fate of our Committee's recommendations is one of the scandals of this post-war period." (P. x.)

Crum's book throws a certain light on the backstage aspects of Anglo-American diplomatic relations with regard to Palestine. True, the Palestine problem itself is presented in a narrow and distorted form. He practically does not touch upon its military-strategical side, and he has only a vague realization of the part played in it by oil. He hazards some absolutely incorrect opinions relative to the national problem in certain European countries. As to the situation in Palestine, he uncritically repeats the arguments of Zionists and is full of blind praise of their activity. Such superficial and incorrect views do not help a clear understanding of the Palestine problem, just as the timid recommendations of the Committee did not help its practical solution.

The appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was one of the first manifestations of that policy of ignoring and by-passing the United Nations which since the war has been pursued by Great Britain and the United States whenever they consider it to their advantage. Crum's account makes clear that both sides had weighty reasons to avoid putting the Palestine problem before the open forum of world opinion. But the attempt has been thwarted by stern realities. The recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee proved ineffective. Now, although belatedly, the Palestine problem has come before the United Nations.



NEW TIMES

30



The General Assembly has now under consideration the recommendations made by the Palestine committee set up at its special session in May of this year. Two sets of recommendations are before the Assembly. The Yugoslav, Indian and Iranian delegates proposed that Palestine should be constituted a federal republic of two states, Jew and Arab. The delegates of the majority of the countries represented on the committee proposed that Palestine should be partitioned into two separate Jewish and Arab states. But the representatives of all countries were of one opinion on what is at present the fundamental issue: the committee unanimously recommended that the British mandate be revoked as soon as possible and that Palestine be granted independence.

50


No. 41

The British administration of Palestine has

ų.

proved utterly bankrupt. It was entirely based on fomenting dissension and conflict between Jews and Arabs as an excuse for brutally pacifying both and thus retaining Palestine as an outpost of British imperialism. American interests have their own schemes with regard to Palestine; they hope to make it a base of United States economic, military and political expansion in the Near and Middle East. A stubborn struggle is still going on behind the scenes between the American and British politicians, impelled by selfish motives that run sharply counter to the interests of both Arabs and Jews and are prejudicial to the general peace and security of the world.

Crum's book lifts a corner of the "silken curtain" and affords us a glimpse of the methods employed in this secret war.



brr 5. **E** 9868 E 194 23 OCT PALESTINE Religious la mondais à fineralent. E9868/46/31 Registry Number Anannach mene an Religiaal commanities " Econordem, industing, the problems involved a mountaining tax and order, FROM E. O. No. tound. Dated Received in Registry 23001-Last Paper (Minutes.) 9864 Weind for record UN (Pol.) Dept. JD out. 29 References Ud. is pulaps interned the UK Subgasion ! S. Ahhhhavid ちん (Print) RECORD OFFICE, 137 fend by c.o. (How disposed of) 51 792 LONDON (Action completed) (Indet Next Paper E9899 32538

In Jerusalem, more that II all then then or 58 area in releating are found the sanctuaries, sites and places sacred to the followers of Judaiam, on Ohristianity and Islam.

24E×9868

Communicated by C.O.

MUTES OF THE RELIGIOUS COMM

To the followers of Islam the Haram Eshe sharif, is second only to Meeca in sanctity. To the Jews the most sacred alte in the world is the Western or Walling Wall, which forms the western boundary of the Harem Sshe Sharif; while this is not the only Herodian remains in Jerusalem it has been sanctified by centuries of pilgrimage so that it now constitutes the one sacred site revered by all Jews throughout the world. This wall has already been the subject of an enquiry conducted by a committee appointed by the League of Hations. The religious hatred between Jews and moslens still constitutes a matter of constant vig1lance on the part of the administration. At certain religious festivals the Jewish worshippers attempt each year to contravene the legislation which was enacted as a

Reference:

37

-

617

92


COPYRIGHT

ĐF

THE PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE,

LONDO



result of the recommendations made by the League of Nations Committee. Unless adequate precautions are taken during these festivals the Moslem worshippers, on the other side of the wall in the Maram Ashe Jharif, would interfere and disturbances, involving bloodshed, would be the result.

Islamic and Jowish religious affairs are of little importance compared to the constant and ever present controversies which occur between the followers of the different Christian churches.


The Christian churches which have interests in the Holy Juces are the Greek Sthodox, the /istin Latin, the Armenian, the Copts, the Syrian Orthodox the Abyssinian. Only the Greek Orthodox and Latin have any considerable number of Arab members.

two

In Jerusalem there are a large number of sacred sites and shrines revered by different Christian churches. The most important of these are the Church of the Holy sepulches, situated within the walled city of old Jerusales, the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin Eary situated in the valley enclosed by the Garden of Gethesemane and the slace of scension on the sount of Olives. In addition there is the bassilics of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, situated space seven kilometres south of Jerusalem.

In all of these shrines various churches of Christian Confessions and Faith have interests, the more complicated being the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Hativity.

To deal with the less important sites first,



Reference:

37

-

0

RECORD

OFFICE,

i.e. the Virgin's Tomb and the Place of Ascension. The Virgin's Tomb is situated in a Christian Church built in the early twelfth century and now "owned" by the Greek Orthodox and the Armsnians while the Copts and Syrian Orthodox have certain rights in it, the Latins (Roman Catholics) who probably originally owned and constructed the Church are now relegated to a small grotto situated in the hillside south of the church. Annually, religious services take place in this church which require the intervention of an independent body, the British District Commissioner, to ensure agreement as to timing and procedure.




three

D

The Place of Ascension which is the traditional site from which Christ ascended to Heaven is now a Moslem Mosque; by custom the various Christian Churches, who have claims to the site, are permitted by the Moslems to celebrate their special services at their own Feasts of the Ascension. During these celebrations it is necessary for an administrative officer to be present supported by a number of British police in order to ensure that the arrangements already agreed to, are complied with. Occasions have arisen when one or other of the religious communities has perpetrated some new and novel proceedings in order to embarrass one of the other communities, such incidents having to be dealt with by the British District Commissioner at once, acting on his own authority.

In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which includes the site of the Orucifiction, the Tomb and site of the Resurrection of Our Lord together with a number of other less important sites, ownership and rights have been matters of dispute during the past



COPYRIGHT

PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE,

Reference:

37

here

The Communities having principal seven hundred years.

claims are the Greek orthodox, the Latins and the Armenians, the other interested communities being the Copts, the Syrian-Orthodox and the Abyssinians. at various times during the Christian era one or other of these communities has held important or dominatory position in relation to the others.

The present disputes arise mainly between the Latin and Eastern churches represented by the Greek orthodox and the armenians. It should be noted that there are Patriachs in Jerusalem for each of \$. these three Confessions. In the 18th century, the Latins supported by France, Spain and Italy /obtai ned

obtained very considerable rights in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. The Greek Orthodox position, obtained with the support of Eussia is based on Firmans granted by the Turks to the Orthodox Patrischs in the middle of the nineteenth century. According to the mandate under which His Majesty's Government administers Palestine, the administration is responsible for maintaining the status quo in religious matters; it is the conditions which prevailed at the time of the military occupation of Palesting in 1918 which the administration now attempts to maintain as that status no. In other words the conditions which provail as a result of the firman of the 19th century are not accepted willingly by the Latins who have the support of the Vatican in these matters.

four

|

Reference:

37

-

617

9

COPYRIGHT


OF

PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE,

LONDO

on account of the confused state of affairs within the Church of the Holy Sepulchre an officer of the District Commissioner's Staff is detailed some two months before husles in each year to work out propriation of procedure and timing. As the Latin church Follows the Gregorian calendar and



the Lastern church (orthodox Armenians, Copts, Syrian and Abysainians) follow the Julian calendar it is impossible to lay down any fixed procedure applicable to every year as in some years the Sasters all came together and in other years there may be as much as rour weeks interval between them. It is necessary during the whole of the Saster celebrations, regardless of which church or Confession is calebrating, for an administrative officer to be present supported by a sufficient force of police to ensure that the arrangements already agreed to are complied with and there any untoward incident which would result in a disturbance of the peace of a

/desecration


description of the Holy Places.

It bethlehem the situation is not so complicated or involved as in the case of the church of the Holy depulches but there is dispute between the claims and rights of the various communities which require constant supervision and control. In this connection it should be noted that the Orthodex Christman, which includes the Copts and Syrians (the abyssinians have no rights at Dethlehem), is celebrated four teen days after the Latin Christman, and the Armenian Christman is celebrated seven days after the Armenian Kew Year, which is celebrated fourteen days after the western New Tear.

five


UL

In addition to these periods of special celebrations there is ever present the risk of some innovation being introduced by the members of one Confession of Faith at the expense of the others. Only recently it was necessary for an administrative officer to intervene in a Latin Procession ascending Calvary by a route which the Orthodox claimed was



contrary to the status quo.

It should be noted that for more than five hundred years the various religious bodies having interests in the Holy Sites in Falestine have been under the authority of an independent and forcign covernment.



Referenc

37

-

ō

RECORD

establish the right of controlling or restoring the Silver Star in the Church of the Nativity which marks the place of the birth of Christ.

six

COPYRI GHT

PF

THE PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE

LOND

Reference

37


6179

て

Disputes at present exist between:

- (a) the Latins and Orthodox regarding Calvary, the Latin authorities relying on support from the Vatican, the Orthodox on the justice of the British Administration;
- (b) the Orthodox and the Armenians and the Latins in the Church of the Maturity;
- (c) the Copts and the Abyssinians regarding the section of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre known as Der es Sultan: in this case both parties to the dispute refer all matters to their respective governments.

One of the more important responsibilities of the British Administration in Jerusalem is the control and supervision of the pilgrims which flock to the Holy City in ever increasing numbers from foreign countries and from all parts of Palestine to attend the religious services of their respective




churches.

The above notes may indicate to some extent the problems involved in maintaining law and order, peace and tranquility within those sites and shrines which are of such significance to the peoples of the Eastern and Western world.

+++

E9899 /G alestine 23 OCT 1947 120 E9899 /46/9 EASTERN H.N.C's policy in Palesine COS (47) 128Th Mig Hin 3 dates 1500 Received 23 00. Last Paper (Minutes) E9856 See E9900/46/G COPYRIGHT References AB at. 27 Ş See within 1. Cos (44) 134 Min Mig Min 9 PUBLIC RECORD 371 (Print)3100 OFFICE, 6179 JBMN.7 (How disposed of) LONDON



1) S.L. Dept: MS 2) Easten Dept. 65

Reference:

37

-

6179

2

COPYRIGHT OF

THE

PUBLIC

RECORD

OFFI

ICE,

LON DON

PALESTINE. 3.

nt discret

Statement

with

10

Home

• Los (LY) 1284 Mlg.

2000

23 067 1947

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute⁺ by the Secretary reporting events and action taken on the previous day as a result of a telegram" from the Secretary of. State for the Colonies on our intention to withdraw from Palestine if no solution was found agreeable to Jews and Arabs.

OJ. 15

LORD MONTGOMERY said he agreed with the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, at Annex II to his minute. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff could offer no further advice until they had studied the reports being prepared by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and the Joint Planning Staff, referred to in paragraph 4 of the minute. He suggested that this should be made clear to the W ment of the military implications which military Foreign Office. He also suggested that the report being ment of the military implications which might follow our wands to int m agreement to take part with other powers in imposing a sensible plan for the partition of Palestine which was generally Dacceptable to both Jews and Arabs.

> In discussion the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, and expressed agreement with the views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Endorsed the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, at Annex II to the Secretary's minute.
- (b) Agreed that no further advice could be submitted until the reports by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and the Joint Planning Staff, outlined in paragraph 4 of the Secretary's minute, had been studied.
- Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to include (c)

in their report their comments on the point referred to by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

(d) Instructed the Secretary to inform⁰ the Foreign Office of the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

> COS 1155/14/10/7. +-No. 2898 **X** Annex I. Ø

<u>ANNEX I</u>

<u>Copy of a letter (reference C.O.S.1163/15/10/7) dated</u> 15th October,1947, from the Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Foreign Office.

x x x


The Minister of Defence, after his discussion with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the Cabinet yesterday, about the reply to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Palestine, said he would send to the Foreign Secretary, for his personal information, a copy of the Ministry of Defence brief on the subject. A copy of this note is attached.

The Chiefs of Staff this morning endorsed the substance of the brief and asked me to say that by Wednesday of next week they would be in a position to give their further views about the strategic implications of the evacuation of our forces from Palestine. At present, the Principal Administrative Officers and the Joint Planning Staff are hard at it in covering the various questions raised by the Foreign Office. Until they receive these reports, the Chiefs of Staff do not wish to say anything further at the present time.

Х

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

60



Х

х

6.0.5(47) 134 the huty -- 6 NOV 1947 67 31 St Colober, 194-PALESTINE (Previous Reference: C.O.S. (47)128th Meeting, Minute

THE SECRETARY was informed by telephone of the comments of the Chiefs of Staff on a draft telegram to H.M.Ambassador, Washington, prepared by the Foreign Office, attached to a Secretary's minute⁺, and the Foreign Office was informed accordingly.


Subsequently, the Foreign Office notified that after further consideration they had decided not to send such a telegram to H.M.Ambassador in Washington.

Gen hander 1001. Gasle Tori.

COS. 1189/20/10/7


-9-

1 Careatar



E9900 G alestin EASTERN E990014619 Stategie implications of evacuation of forces from Palesina GC Stapleton 4/dep to Mr Dixon COB 1163/15/10/7 dated is out Received 23 000 Last Paper (Minutes) E9899 of the three conclusions in para. 7 References Note brief (a) is self-evident (b) is negative and (c) is dangerous As regards (c) we are taking (Print) particular care not to be involved in a repetition of 5 (How disposed of) 9 our year-long endeavours to find て settlement. The manie point α if our decision to withdraw is to regain our focedom of manoeuvre and bring the two sides to regotrite. We must be very (Action (Index) Careful about involving enselves completed) WA in negotitions to amend the putition plans Next Paper By J. Semi Servies Liaison Dept. or. 27

69 think & is all right provided we keep in the background and mere anly encourage that working out a bossible partition Colution (i.e. Leib Committee I in New York) to aim at the fairest possible partition Alam. Janun 38/ fo x C RECORD 37 OFFICE, 6179 LONDO




E pha MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, - 163 15 10 7. GREAT GEORGE STREET. Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000 Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000 <u>TOP SHORET</u> *Eastern Dept. IG/CO Eastern Dept. IG/CO IG/CO Eastern Dept. IG/CO IG/CO Eastern Dept. IG/CO IG/CO*

The Minister of Defence, after his discussion with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the Cabinet yesterday, about the reply to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Palestine, said he would send to the Foreign Secretary, for his personal information, a copy of the Ministry of Defence brief on the subject. A copy of this note is attached.

The Chief's of Staff this morning endorsed the substance of the brief and asked me to say that by Wednesday of next week they would be in a position to give their further views about the strategic implications of the evacuation of our forces from Palestine. At present, the Principal Administrative Officers and the Joint Planning Staff are hard at it in covering the various questions raised by the Foreign Office. Until they receive these reports, the Chief's of Staff do not wish to say anything further at the present time.

fours sincerely Tapeeton

P.J. Dixon, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign Office.





TOP SECRET

MINISTER

You asked for my comments on the attached telegram from the Colonial Secretary.

- 2. The telegram raises two main issues:-
 - (a) Whether or not we should now commit ourselves to a date when, in the absence of a solution acceptable to both sides, His Majesty's Government propose to withdraw.
 - (b) What contribution we ourselves should make in the discussions in New York towards the forming of a satiafactory solution.

Possible Date of Withdrawal

3. I submit that it would be a great mistake for His Majesty's Government to commit itself now to a specific date for withdrawal from Palestine. My reasons are as follows:-

(a) We are only proposing to withdraw in the event of disagreement between the Arabs and the

of disagreement between the Arabs and the Jews and this postulates a measure of hostility from one side or the other during our withdrawal. Although partition seems to be emerging as the solution from New York, we have no idea what the boundary between the two States will be and have, therefore, no conception of the degree of hostility with which we shall have to contend in withdrawal. We cannot, therefore, at this stage say how long it will take us to get out.

(b) No decision has yet been reached on the shape

		COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LO
1 2	3	Reference:
-		

2

Oi in the Event of the Assanbly waching up solution. TD.

and nature of the transitional administration to which we shall have to hand over, nor do we know whether that administration will be backed with organised armed strength. Announcement of a date now might, therefore, bring us to a point when we have to withdraw and leave the country without any administration or security.

(c) Whilst the re-emphasis of our intention to withdraw would undoubtedly make quite clear our fixed determination, it seems that an announcement of a date would have no effect in breaking the obstinacy of the Arabs and the Jews. On the contrary, according to King Abdullah, it is our presence there more than anything else which is restraining active Arab opposition.

-1-



U.K. Contribution to the Solution

The Americans and the Russians have said that they favour 4. partition in principle. The Jews accept it and the Arabs are bitterly opposed to it and must now realise that any modifications to the present plan can only be achieved with our assistance. If we fail to exercise our influence at least as far as it is possible to go in achieving acquiescence between the two parties, we stand to lose our strategic and egonomic assets in the Arab World. Surely here is our chance to put forward some modification to the scheme of partition which, without causing the Jews to withdraw their acceptance, might bring the Arabs to acquiescence. We might then retain our political, economic and strategic position in Palestine and keep the Russians out.

The consequences of alienating the Arab World do of 5• course extend beyond the future of Palestine into the whole scheme of Commonwealth Defence.

Subsidiary Points

- 6. (a) The possibility of our withdrawing to the fringe of Palestine, e.g. in the Negeb area, is ruled out because of geographical conditions.
 - (b) Lasting hostility from the Arab World will gravely prejudice our chances of a firm hold on the Middle East because it is unlikely that we shall gain any strategic facilities from any of the Arab States, or their support for our claim to Cyrenaica.
 - (c) Unless we hand over to a competent authority properly supported by security forces, we stand to lose our economic and strategic facilities in Palestine.
- To sum up, I suggest:-7.
 - (a) You support the idea of re-emphasizing our determination to withdraw.

م بر المحمد المحمام المحما المما المما المما المما المما المما المما المما المما المما المما الممام الممام الممام المماما المماما المماما المماما المماما المماما المماما المماما مماما مما م		
	EL	
	Reference:	
	Reference: FO 371 61792	
	61792	

- (b) You strongly oppose the mention of a date for withdrawal at this stage.
- (c) You advocate that we should use our influence to modify the partition plans in such a way as to bring the greatest measure of acquiescence between the Arabs and Jews as possible.

(SEL) D. C. STAFLETON

I must also mention that before a decision is taken - if only the delay is by tomorrow - the Chiefs of Staff should be given the opportunity to tender their advice.

-2-

14th October, 1947

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE


Class ... 37/ Piece ... 61792

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

E9902/46/31



		E9908 /Gm
172- 21	TASTIERN	
E9908 /46/9	Palestine : Tiopos concretation	als for
New York	Champanetra e construction de la manager provinción de la manager	
3018		
Dares 22 000 Received 23 00		
Last Paper.	() Min uters)	
E9900	It is suggested the	hat this telegram should
References.	be repeated to the Arab post for the personal information and the High Commissioner. be informed of what is going take a suitable line if ques should, however, be treated stage. I submit a draft tel	ts and to Jerusalem n of our representatives They should clearly g on so that they may stioned. The matter as very secret at this
(Print.) (How disposed of.)	The scheme describ Mr. Beeley's thesis that it bring the Americans (as repr behind the Jews) into direct Arabs. Thus the two forces now made it impossible for u will be brought into direct	resenting the main strength c negotiations with the s, which have up till as to find a settlement.
8) w.o. Adlin	no longer be in the thankles	ss role of intermediary.
A.H.	telegram that we would on ba	rom para.6 of this

Reference:

371

(

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDO 6179 て launch this attempt at a later date. It has not, C.O. however, been possible to hold it up and the matter Cab of 2400 is now in the hands of Mr. Wadsworth (lately U.S. Minister in Beirut and now U.S. Ambassador at Mr. Wadsworth is well known for his Tal) Cano 1982 Baghdad). pro-Arab views, but I think he may find it difficult, Ragdad 925 in view of the present stand of the U.S. in favour of the Majority Plan for partition, to "sell" the Jodda 440 idea to U.S. Officials and Politicians. Alman 469 Bein 663 This telegram is being distributed in the usual way to the Colonial Office, the War Office, Jamas Cuesy b De Oci 70 Rpi 3 Now Tork 360% the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. (J.G.S. Beith) <u>24th October, 1947</u>. NO tris minute was written before Jeening The attributed animate by SIS. Jp. W100 11063 (Action chusalander.) completed.) WAN. Next Paper. We 30047 F.O.F.

We have the delemina that if action is taken on these lines now the Flux will le intransgent because they hope the Assembly will back partition. If we wait till after the Astempty entres the Jews will have got what they wanted, I to will be still more intronsigent, or there will have been no decision. Then the Arado will be intransigent. I have added I the traff Il. SAH fur + raid Lance that an pros need some gridance Athat sait is onggester Jud. Say, if tackled seens the the Jafest 'the least we can do coltrair oppening to be againist all attempts at conclusion AName flen by fir O. fargent. Jul. sen S.



E9908 46 9

MARGIN.

THIS

Z

WRITTEN

ВП

5

UZ

I have only just seen telegram No.3018 of October 22nd from New York upon which Kirkbride comments in his telegram No. 322 of 30th October. It is impossible to reject out of hand the opinion of anyone so experienced as Kirkbride or to forget Nuri's passion for intrigue. At the same time there are two or three points which I think must be taken into consideration before this plan is written off as useless. They are:-

Minutes.

C MOV. 1947

Putwith

- The initiative would not come from (a) Nuri himself.
- I am convinced that he is both sincere (b) in his desire to see the Palestine question settled in a way not too contrary to Arab hopes and also that he rejected the Mufti as hopelessly uncompromising long ago.
- (c) He knows that King Abdullah is not popular in several of the Arab countries and told me himself some months ago that he found the Regent of Iraq very difficult to interest for long in any serious project.

2. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the qualifications of King Ibn Saud as a spokesman for the Arab point of view and, although Sir A. Kirkbride would's suggests that the spotlight would fall on the "Saudists", I cannot see that his choice could have fallen on any other leader or that he could have effectively eliminated the Mufti's influence by any other acceptable device.

K.C.Buss

COPYRI GHT

0F

THE PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE,

LON DON

Reference

37

-

3rd November, 1947.

61792 NOTHI Mr. Burrows, Eastern Dept. Mil Gow an 1B.m.7

Eastern Dept. To san 4/5's minute: 76 "I believe this is bound to fail The Jeus will become more exacting, but I to not intend to interfere".

Ì

C

RECORD

OFFICE,

LONDO

37

37

1 9

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

D. 1.57 p.m. 22nd October 1947 R.10.10 p.m. 22nd October 1947 No. 3018 22nd October 1947 Realized Lower Week for and have when the work of the second second when the second se

Repeated to Washington

IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET

Following for Burrows from Beeley.

Palestine:

At a recent meeting of Commonwealth delegates on the subject of Palestine Dr. Evatt enquired which of the Arab delegates would be most ready to consider proposals for conciliation. Nuri Pasha was suggested. Man [sic] and I have since heard from Nuri himself that he was approached by Evatt with the suggestion that a sub-Committee of the Palestine Committee should be formed to explore the possibility of conciliation.

2. Nuri welcomed this suggestion, which has also been discussed by Evatt with the Turkish Delegation and apparently with some others. He thinks however, that nothing can come of it because - apart from probable Jewish obstinacy - the Arab Delegations here would be bound to take instructions from home which would mean that the decisive influence on their attitude would lie with the Mufti of Jerusalem. Nuri has therefore been trying to think of some way of eliminating the Mufti's influence so that on the Arab side at least a measure of compromise would become a possibility. He has now hit upon the following idea which has also been expounded to us - at a separate and earlier interview - by Hafiz Wahba.

3. The idea is that an attempt at joint arbitration should be made by Ibn Saud in person_together with a representative of United States Government. The other Arab States would bind themselves in advance to accept any award agreed upon by the two principals. It would then be impossible for the Mufti to resist it effectively. The meeting should take place in Jedda or Riyadh.

4. Having worked out this plan Nuri first approached Feisal who asked for time to consider it and to refer to his father. On 19th October Feisal informed Nuri that the plan was acceptable adding, however, that it would be well for the King to have advisers from the other Arab States in attendance during the talks. This would make it easier for / him....

him to go to the limit of reasonable concessions.

5. Nuri thereupon approached the Heads of the other Arab Delegations and Jamal Husseini all of whom gave their approval to the plan. The way was thus clear for an approach to the Americans.

6. Before formally discussing the proposal with the Americans which he hoped to do at a very high level Nuri wished us to take some preliminary soundings and let him know what the chances appeared to be. I suggested that the Americans having committed themselves so outspokenly to the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority plan might find it difficult to engage now in discussions obviously directed towards a different solution and that the time for Arab-American conversations might not come until it was clear that the Assembly could provide no effective settlement of

the problem. To this Nuri replied that if the Assembly failed to solve the problem Arab spirits would at once rise and it would become more difficult for Ibn Saud to make adequate concessions. In any case nothing could be lost by making an attempt now. His Majesty's Government would surely be pleased if a settlement could be arrived at in the way he suggested. I agreed and promised to pass on what he had told me to the State Department.

ō

RECORD

CE.

Ī

37

617

9

7. I have accordingly given the story to Wadsworth of the United States Delegation who will keep me informed of developments.

8. Neither Nuri nor Sheikh Hafiz indicated the basis on which they thought an agreed settlement was possible. I learn from another source however that Faris Bey is speaking of cantonisation as an acceptable solution and this fits in with the report in Beirut telegram No. 756 to Foreign Office that Azzam thinks the Arabs might now accept something on the lines of the Moohsapison plan.

9. Please inform Colonial Office.

[Copy sent to Mr. Burrows]

CCC

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E9908

Cypher/OTP

1

6

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

 No. 3018
 D. 1.57 p.m. 22nd October 1947

 R.10.10 p.m. 22nd October 1947

 22nd October 1947

Repeated to Washington

IMPEDIATE TOP SECRET

1


Following for Burrows from Beeley.

Palestine.

At a recent meeting of Commonwealth delegates on the subject of Palestine Dr. Evatt enquired which of the Arab delegates would be most ready to consider proposals for conciliation. Nuri Pasha was suggested. Man [sic] and I have since heard from Nuri himself that he was approached by Evatt with the suggestion that a sub-Committee of the Palestine Committee should be formed to explore the possibility of conciliation.


2. Nuri welcomed this suggestion, which has also been discussed by Evatt with the Turkish Delegation and apparently with some others. He thinks however, that nothing can come of it because - apart from probable Jewish obstinacy - the Arab Delegations here would be bound to take instructions from home which would mean that the decisive influence on their attitude would lie with the Mufti of Jerusalem. Nuri has therefore been trying to think of some way of eliminating the Mufti's influence so that on the Arab side at least a measure of compromise would become a possibility. He has now hit upon the following idea which has also been expounded to us - at a separate and earlier interview - by Hafiz Wahba.

				en e	
and a second					
	FTT				
	E _ =				
	Ref	COPY			
	erence:-	RIGH			
	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	F OF			
		THE			
	U	PUBL			
	ಲ	IC R			
	371	ECOR			
		RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON	in the second		
	51	ICE,			
	61792	LON			
	NO	8			



3. The idea is that an attempt at joint arbitration should be made by Ibn Saud in person together with a representative of United States Government. The other Arab States would bind themselves in advance to accept any award agreed upon by the two principals. It would then be impossible for the fufti to resist it effectively. The meeting should take place in Jedda or Riyadh.

4. Having worked out this plan Nuri first approached Feisal who asked for time to consider it and to refer to his father. On 19th October Feisal informed Nuri that the plan was acceptable adding, however, that it would be well for the King to have advisers from the other Arab States in attendance during the talks. This would make it easier for / him....



him to go to the limit of reasonable concessions.

-2-


5. Nuri thereupon approached the Heads of the other Arab Delegations and Jamal Husseini all of whom gave their approval to the plan. The way was thus clear for an approach to the Americans.


6. Before formally discussing the proposal with the Americans which he heped to do at a very high level Nuri wished us to take some preliminary soundings and let him know what the chances appeared to be. I suggested that the Americans having committed themselves so outspakenly to the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority plan might find it difficult to engage now in discussions obviously directed towards a different solution and that the time for Arab-American conversations might not come until it was clear that the Assembly could provide no effective settlement of the problem. To this Nuri replied that if the Assembly failed to solve the problem Arab spirits would at once rise and it would become more difficult for Ibn-Saud to make adequate concessions. In any case nothing could be lost by making an attempt now. His Lajesty's Government would surely be pleased if a settlement could be arrived at in the way he suggested. I agreed and promised to pass on what he had told me to the State Department.

7. I have accordingly given the story to Wadsworth of the United States Delegation who will keep me informed of developments.

8. Neither Muri nor Sheikh Hafiz indicated the basis on which they thought an agreed settlement was possible. I learn from another source however that Faris Bey is speaking of cantonisation as an acceptable solution and this fits in with the report in Beirut telegram No. 756 to Foreign Office that Azzam thinks the Arabs might now accept something on the lines of the Mochsapison plan.


9. Please inform Colonial Office.





Registry No. Egg 0 & 46/4-IMPORTANT. XXXXXX F. O., XXXXX Confidential. 24th October 1947. JGSB Notriced. Ødek IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL Despatched М. Draft. ANN MELEVEN MOHA 1992 Cairo 985 Bag Palestine. Jedda 1-1-1-1) I am repeating to you for your 4-69 Amman Beirut 66 Telegram. Damascus personal and top secret information New York Telegram No. 3018, regarding a scheme for direct *No*..... regotiations (Date) Get 35 enasions between Arab representatives, MARGIN headed by Ibn Saud, and U.S. representativesy Repeat to :--in regard to Patestine. You should be aware of the situation in U.K. Delegation case any repercussions may reach you, but Reference New York Washington 11059 HIS GHT the subject matter should be treated as top Jerusalen F Z secret. 2. Rescheme is an interesting PUBLIC WRITTEN 3.5. Beins one, though it will be difficielt دی 7 RECORD Is find a moment at which OFFICE, ш Ω つ both Jews & Araks are ready janak. 0 LONDO 1 9 to make any appreciable て NIHTO concessions. I think it will Cypher. le best for HMG not to become Distribution :-Departmental No. Palestine Distribution. directly associated with the Dip - Server scheme for the time being. If asked for your advice on it Copies to :-for should say that HMG welcome any more designed N.O. (PA) to improve the chances of an agreed

S agreed settlement. Hough they are not themselves at present committed bang particular means of doing to. 589 Ja 24 **MARGIN** THIS Z WRITTEN 371 ВЕ 6179



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E9908/46/G Confidential Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

82

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES AT

<u>No. 1982</u>

No. 663 No. 546

N**o**.

NO. No. 925

440 469

CAIRO	
BAGDAD	
JEDDA	
AMMAN	
BEIRUT	
DAMASCUS	

October 25th, 1947.

D. 5.25 a.m. October 26th, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3656, Washington No. 11068 and Jerusalem

IMPOR TANT


CONFIDENTIAL


Palestine.

I am repeating to you for your personal and top secret information New York telegram No. 3018. You should be aware of the situation in case any repercussions may reach you, but the subject matter should be treated as top secret.


2. The scheme is an interesting one, though it will be difficult to find a moment at which both Jews and Arabs are ready to make any appreciable concessions. It will be best for His Majesty's Government not to become directly associated with the scheme for the time being. If asked for your advice on it you should say that His Majesty's Government welcome any move designed to improve the chances of an agreed settlement, though they are not themselves at present committed to any particular means of deing so.

		Υ.			
	aliz ali	2011 AND			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•				
				ed a geographic	
	1				
	1				
	ł		stati da		
-	[
	ł		N		
			l de la pad		
- 0					
20	8				
efe	PYI		. 2 04 ()		
re	RIG				
Reference:-	HT				
	OF				
	Ţ				
	Ē				
	PUE				
619	C J			NAS L	
	}EC				
1000	ORC				
IK	0				
	FF			5.1. 5.1 E	
5	CE				
6179	COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONG				





alistine E9928/G 2. 31 EASTERN 123 2 9° T 1997 E9928 14614 Recting of Palestine Committee on 2100. New York 3021 dated as oct Received 24 DET Last Paper. (Minutes.) E9928 See Eggo3 and minute Hort. 24 References. COPYRIGHT E9865/951/3, F4480/4×1/31 THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, -(Print.) 37 (How disposed of.) De Mr Fumplikey No "D 6179 LONDO from Mr Dikon 24 OCI 2 (Action completed.) (Index.) WH 943 Next Paper. 28888 F.O.P. 9



Cypher/OTP.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE,

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

 No. 3021.
 D. 6.18 p.m. 22nd October 1947.

 22nd October 1947.
 R. 1.24 a.m. 23rd October 1947.

 Repeated to:
 Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

PERSONAL.

Following for Secretary of State from Colonial Secretary.

[Begins]

The Palestine Committee met yesterday and today and had before it all the proposals which emerged from the general discussion and were embodied in my earlier telegrams Nos.2983 and 2992. The Russians wanted to pass immediately to acceptance of principle of partition but this suggestion was defeated and Evatt with overwhelming support insisted that Committee should appoint a sub-committee of persons sympathetic to partition to submit a scheme within eight days. This sub-committee would consider boundaries and other adjustments and such matters as immigration, substitute authority for Palestine and implementation so that full Committee may know with more precision what it would be asked to vote on and have full realisation of what is involved by their vote. At same time a second sub-committee would study the Arab proposals for a

て

similar purpose. There would be a conciliation subcommittee as well available throughout the rest of the Committee's work to reduce area of disagreement between Jews and Arabs and bring them to common ground if possible.

2. Though present I have not contributed to these discussions because I felt that the United Nations should feel its own way to methods of procedure for reaching a solution; but weighing up situation here I thought Evatt's line the wiser way of beinging Committee to face realistically the problem of partition. At this stage I think we should not get involved in procedural matters. We had better keep our freedom until the United Nations has reached some tentative conclusions by not committing ourselves to one scheme or another and by not serving as members of the sub-committees. I have offered all the experience and knowledge we possess for the use of the sub-committees and we shall be ready to sit with them and give information and, for example, indicate difficulties involved in particular proposals.

/ 3. We

3. We cannot deal with our Displaced Persons Resolution till next week but sub-committees are of course quite free to make recommendations on this topic for consideration by the full Committee.

 $\mathbf{2}$

[Ends].

W:W:7:W:W



.

.

O

Reference:-

TO

371

61792

COPYRIGHT OF

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

86

Cypher/OTP.

P.R.I.S.E.C.

5/5 87

COPYRI

RECORD

OFFICE,

LONDO

Referen

37

37 .

-1

9

2

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3021.

22nd October 1947.

D. 6.18 p.m. 22nd October 1947. R. 1.24 a.m. 23rd October 1947.

Repeated to: Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

PERSONAL.


ATE. L. Following for Secretary of State from the bolton [Begins] Colonial Secretary.

The Palestine Committee met yesterday and today and had before it all the proposals which emerged from the general discussion and were embodied in my earlier telegrams Nos. 2983 and 2992. The Russians wanted to pass immediately to acceptance of principle of partition but this suggestion was defeated and Evatt with overwhelming support insisted that Committee should appoint a sub-committee of persons sympathetic to partition to submit a scheme within eight days. This sub-committee would consider boundaries and other adjustments and such matters as immigration, substitute authority for Palestine and implementation so that full Committee may know with more precision what it would be asked to vote on and have full realisation of what is involved by their vote. At same time a second sub-committee would study the Arab proposals for a similar purpose. There would be a conciliation subcommittee as well available throughout the rest of the Committee's work to reduce area of disagreement between

Jews and Arabs and bring them to common ground if possible.

2. Though present I have not contributed to these discussions because I felt that the United Nations should feel its own way to methods of procedure for reaching a solution; but weighing up situation here I thought Evatt's line the wiser way of beinging Committee to face realistically the problem of partition. At this stage I think we should not get involved in procedural matters. We had better keep our freedom until the United Nations has reached some tentative conclusions by not committing ourselves to one scheme or another and by not serving as members of the sub-committees. I have offered all the experience and knowledge we possess for the use of the sub-committees and we shall be ready to sit with them and give information and, for example, indicate difficulties involved in particular proposals.


/ 3. We




88

Reference:

371



$W \bullet W \bullet W \bullet W \bullet W$



E9928/ Lappy scal to: AV. Rev Newsam,

89


FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

24th October, 1947.

After seeing the Colonial Secretary's telegrams Nos. 3003, 3021 and 3031 from New York, the Foreign Secretary feels that the balance of advantage may lie in Mr. Creech-Jones coming home. The Colonial Office methodally agree with this view. Would you let me know whether the Prime Minister agrees that a further telegram should be sent to Mr. Creech-Jones in the terms of the enclosed draft, in which the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies has concurred.

(Sd.) P. J. DIXON

J.L. Pumphrey, Esq., 10, Downing Street.



NEW YORK.

P.D.

IMMEDIATE. TOP SECRET.

	Your telegram No.3003 fof October 21st:
No	Colonial Secretary and Palestine
Cypher	Personal for Colonial Secretary from
Date	the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.
Diplomatic Secret.	We fully realise what a number of tasks
	are awaiting you at home and how inconvenient
	it is for you to be away. We are not clear
	from your telegrams Nos. 3021 and 3031 when
	the question of principle will come up, but
For concurrence	gather that matters are not likely to come to a
of Prime Minister.	head just yet. We therefore feel that you
	should be free to come home whenever you
	judge the moment opportune. You will no
	doubt determine your actual date of departure

in the light of developments of the Palestine situation which you are much better able to assess than ourselves.

90

N

3

ø

Reference:

371

61792

COPYRIGHT OF


THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

 $\langle \zeta \rangle$


2. We should like to know whether in your absence Cadogan will be in charge of the Palestine question.


1k 6/ E E 9967 91 1947 25 <u>OCT</u> PALESTINE Lynia Relation fronter foridate. $\frac{\text{Registry}}{\text{Number}} \right\} \in 9967/46/31$ Refer Dansaver til 85 & Separalem (69902/46/81). Water of Napena stated Leppices President TELEGRAM FROM nor very much pleased with the "ommengal whill do terevalen pertodag "merinan profiles invertish which is his apinion for fair enough the upplithenge 11 Mundal No.Ranarcus Dated Received in Registry 23, Jet 25 -ADDRETTION JORGIALEM 88. (Minutes.) Last Paper. Elen 9928 Ca.G.CA1365) References. 27/10 Uni incident is now ratifactorily settled. The Syrans were given brike some days ago (Print.) but the He has only just but the W (How disposed of.) Mathenian 6.0. M. Beins

COPYRIGHT Refer PUBLIC RECORD 371 OFFICE, 61792 LON DOI




Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.





retained by the	author	rised rec	ipien	t and no	t passed	0
Cypher/OTP	<u>C</u>	BINET DI	STRIB	UTION	anE	
	FROM	DAMASCUS	to J	ERUSALEM		
Mr. Dundas No. 88 23rd October,	1947.	D.7.36 R.9.15		24th Oc 24th Oc	ober 194 ober 194	777
Repeated to Fo	reign	Office No	0. 46	3		
My tele gr	am No.	8 5. (j	, 25	ост		

62 E 9974 92 25 OCT PALESTINE Aprilia - Palater broating Kondiat. $\begin{array}{c} \text{Registry} \\ \text{Number} \end{array} \in \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{E} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} & \mathcal{P} \\ \mathcal{P}$ Rfor Finister El 1449. All invidente lado TELEGRAM FROM nie has sitted ordering one a restail Mi Mardal spain liggest symmet Bashel No. P. P. M. A. St. C transaction or printed . loop a touch Dated 464 Received . in Registry } ne positioning of pronted ports, 23 20F 25 -Last Paper. (Minutes.) sums reasonable. The indered in herd. 4 9967 but it is sally all to Padertine to decide. Refe COPYRIGHT References. Calle PF TECABAR/ voor fileane ne refly from Filentine PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LOND 371 (Print.)(How disposed of.) 6179 8, Moatherson て 101-28 (Action (Inde complete (.) Next Paper E9977 W1. 24772/217 17°05 10/38 F.O.P.



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and net passed on.]

94

Cypher/OTPCABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE9974Mr. Dundes
No. 464D. 6.10 p.m. 25 OCT
D. 6.10 p.m. 23rd October, 1947.23rd October, 1947.R. 7.44 p.m. 23rd October, 1947.Repeated to : Jerusalem
Beirut

CONFID ENTIAL

MM


Jerusalem telegram No. 1449 to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Frontier incidents.

All incidents have now been settled and everyone is [gp. undec. ? content]. again. I fully share the High Commissioner's view that there is a danger that the incidents may be exaggerated in the press and I have done my best to ensure that they should be treated by everyone here as mistakes having no political significance.

2. The Head of Political Section, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has today given me a list of complaints as to Jewish action in the neighbourhood of the Syrian frontier which his Government considers provocative. None of them are of importance.

5. I pointed out that Syrian manoeuvres had obviously resulted in an increased determination on the part of the Jews to be ready to defend themselves if attacked; but that as long as we remained responsible for the administration of Palestine we would ensure that there was no threat to Syria




from the inhabitants of Palestine.

4. Until British Forces withdrew from Syria information was exchanged between Syrian army and British military authorities in Palestine on the position of military frontier posts and I understand similar information is still exchanged between the two police forces.

5. If you and the High Commissioner see no objection I would ask the Syrian Minister of Defence informally whether he would agree to the Commander of the North Legion keeping in touch with the British Commander in North Palestine and exchanging information through their respective staffs concerning the positioning of posts in the frontier area, with a view to co-ordination of efforts to prevent snuggling and illegal crossings of the frontier. Such co-operation might lead to the withdrawal of redundant posts and would, I believe, materially decrease the risk of frontier incidents.

AL IN'S


Repeated te Beirut as my telegram No. 330.




37


-

E 9977 /G MISTL EASPERN 124 Palesine: Roposed maing E 9952 146/C with U.S. Delagation New York 3062 dated 24 Det Received 2500. Mr. Discon heils me that in view of this alegram, the s.fs. is anarious for Mr. Last Paper. E9928 breech. gones to return as som as possible (J.E.CABLE) and a telegram has been suit to that effect. Refer COPYRIGHT References. T I de Douplas has now cen the S.) S 371 (Print.) RECORD (How disposed of.) 6179



96 E9952 4619 9977 The S. S. wishes to see Refer the U.S. Amb- on Manday at 10.30 RIGHT to -prak to him about T. Troops in germany. 371 RECORD S. S. will not hourself 0 raise Palest. i. 6179 P LONDC





Private Science,

This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

DIPLOMPIC (DECEM)

these rate leads the standard the second

(From United Hingdom Delegation to United Hations)


No. 3062.D. 12.12. a.m. Uctober 25th, 1947.October 24th, 1947.D. 6.32. a.u. Uctober 25th, 1947.

Palestine.

de have been trying, before Cub-Committee 1 of the Palestine Committee proceeds any farther, to arrange a meeting with the United States delegation. They inform us however, that bouglas is being sent to London to try to develop the United States viewpoint with you. They feel that there would be little advantage in discussions here until after your exchange of views with bouglas.

I de net know what Douglas will propose. 2. United States delegation here express anxiety at the tendency of our two Governments towards opposite conclusions on this question.

66666



37

-

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be Exp retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

9977

FORE

FROM HENY YOLL TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Mingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3062.D. 12.12. a.m. October 25th, 1947.October 24th, 1947.R. 6.32. a.m. October 25th, 1947.

Repeated to Washington.

ILLEDIATE.

LIGHT.

TOP SECRET.


Following for Secretary of State from Linister of State.

Palestine.

We have been trying, before Sub-Committee 1 of the Palestine Committee proceeds any farther, to arrange a meeting with the United States delegation. They inform us however, that Douglas is being sent to London to try to develop the United States viewpoint with you. They feel that there would be little advantage in discussions here until after your exchange of views with Douglas.

2. I do not know what Douglas will propose.

					0
Ē		ni i aizte	-		
	ET	Π			
ς.					
	È├-ª				
	Refer	COPYRI			
	Reference:-	COPYRIGHT O			
		FTHE			
	U	PUBLI		20-00 - 10-00 - 10-00	
	371	C RECO			an Ra
		F THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LOND			
	6	FFICE,			
	6179	LONG			



United States delegation here express anxiety at the tendency of our two Governments towards opposite conclusions on this question.

66666

